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CRIMINAL LAW
IN SEARCH OF THE IMPARTIAL JURY*
JAMES J. GOBERT**
I. INTRODUCTION
The sixth amendment to the United States Constitution guaran-
tees an accused the right to an impartial jury.' A jury, however,
* Copyright 1987. James J. Gobert. All rights reserved.
** Professor of Law, University of Tennessee College of Law; B.A., 1967, Cornell
University; J.D., 1970, Duke University. A portion of this Article was written while the
author was a Visiting Professor at the University of Essex in England. Several of his
colleagues at Essex, including Sheldon Leader, Alan Ward, and Carolyn Yates, as well as
John Sebert of the University of Tennessee provided thoughtful comments on earlier
drafts of this article. The author is also indebted to Greg Gundlach, Libby McCroskey,
and Andy Walsh, students and former students of the University of Tennessee, for their
research and other assistance. Finally, the author is grateful for the summer support
provided by the University of Tennessee College of Law.
I U.S. CONsT. amend. VI. The sixth amendment applies only to the federal govern-
ment. The right to an impartial jury was extended to the states in Duncan v. Louisiana,
391 U.S. 145 (1968). In Duncan, the Supreme Court incorporated the sixth amendment
provision into the fourteenth amendment's due process clause, finding that it was a fun-
damental tenet of Anglo-American jurisprudence. Id. at 149. The right to jury trial is
also mentioned in article III of the Constitution: "The Trial of all Crimes except in
Cases of Impeachment, shall be by Jury . . ." U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2(3). See also Ris-
taino v. Ross, 424 U.S. 589, 595 n.6 (1976)(right to impartial jury guaranteed both by
incorporation of sixth amendment into fourteenth and by principles of due process);
Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 501 (1972)(same). The Court in Duncan did note that there
is no right to jury trial for "petty offenses." 391 U.S. at 159. See also Baldwin v. New
York, 399 U.S. 66 (1970)(offense carrying penalty of imprisonment for more than six
months is not "petty").
The focus of this Article is on impartiality in the criminal jury context. The seventh
amendment provides for ajury trial in many civil cases. U.S. CoNsT. amend. VII. Unlike
the sixth amendment, no guaranty of impartiality is explicitly mentioned in the seventh
amendment. While this striking change of language might seem to suggest, as a matter
of construction, that there is no constitutional right to an impartial jury in a civil trial,
such an interpretation was probably not intended by the drafters, who envisioned a civil
jury trial as it existed at common law. See McDonough Power Equipment, Inc. v. Green-
wood, 464 U.S. 548 (1984). See also Kiernan v. Van Schaik, 347 F.2d 775, 778 (3d Cir.
1965) (right to impartial jury in civil cases is implicit in fifth and seventh amendments).




need not and does not provide reasons for its verdicts. 2 Jurors can-
not be punished or otherwise held legally liable for their decisions.3
Their deliberations are protected from critical scrutiny by a shroud
of secrecy.4 Verdicts of acquittal are virtually unreviewable by ap-
pellate courts, 5 and verdicts of guilty are only slightly less so. 6
2 See, e.g., United States v. Lee, 532 F.2d 911 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 838
(1976); United States v. Miller, 284 F. Supp. 220, 225 (D. Conn.), appeal dismissed, 403
F.2d 77 (2d Cir. 1968).
3 See, e.g., Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 509 (1978); Yaselli v. Goff, 12 F.2d 396,
403 (2d Cir. 1926), aft'd, 275 U.S. 503 (1927). Seealso Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409,
423 n.20 (1976)(grand jurors). Jurors could at one time be fined or imprisoned for
returning an improper verdict, but this is no longer the case. See M. BLOOMSTEIN, VER-
DICT: THEJURY SYSTEM 17-18 (1968); W. CORNISH, THEJURY 140-42 (1965); P. DEVLIN,
TRIAL BY JURY 17-18, 41, 67-69 (1956); Friloux, Another View from the Bar in THE JURY
SYSTEM IN AMERICA: A CRITICAL OVERVIEW 228 (R. Simon ed. 1975).
4 See Tanner v. United States, 107 S. Ct. 2731 (1987), United States v. Homer, 411
F. Supp. 972, 980 (W.D. Pa. 1976), aff'd, 545 F.2d 864 (3d Cir.), cert. denied 431 U.S. 954
(1977); United States v. Miller, 284 F. Supp. 220 (D. Conn.), appeal dismissed, 403 F. 2d
77 (2d Cir. 1968); United States v. Driscoll, 276 F. Supp. 333 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); Vaise v.
Delaval, 99 Eng. Rep. 944 (K.B. 1785). See also 18 U.S.C. § 1508 (1982)(crime to listen
to, observe, or record proceedings of jury or attempt to do same); FED. R. EVID.
606(b)(uror may not testify as to factor influencing verdict except to disclose extrane-
ous prejudicial information brought to the jury's attention or outside influence).
The rationale behind the rule that a juror may not impeach the verdict of the jury
was discussed by the Supreme Court in McDonald v. Pless, 238 U.S. 264 (1915). The
Court observed that the rule was based on a balancing of policy considerations:
The rule is based upon controlling considerations of a public policy which in
these cases chooses the lesser of two evils. When the affidavit of a juror, as to the
misconduct of himself or the other members of the jury, is made the basis of a
motion for a new trial the court must choose between redressing the injury of the
private litigant and inflicting the public injury which would result ifjurors were per-
mitted to testify as to what had happened in the jury room.
These two conflicting considerations are illustrated in the present case. If the
facts were as stated in the affidavit, the jury adopted an arbitrary and unjust method
in arriving at their verdict, and the defendant ought to have had relief, if the facts
could have been proved by witnesses who were competent to testify in a proceeding
to set aside the verdict. But let it once be established that verdicts solemnly made
and publicly returned into court can be attacked and set aside on the testimony of
those who took part in their publication and all verdicts could be, and many would
be, followed by an inquiry in the hope of discovering something which might invali-
date the finding. Jurors would be harassed and beset by the defeated party in an
effort to secure from them evidence of facts which might establish misconduct suffi-
cient to set aside a verdict. If evidence thus secured could be thus used, the result
would be to make what was intended to be a private deliberation, the constant sub-
ject of public investigation-to the destruction of all frankness and freedom of dis-
cussion and conference.
id. at 267-68.
5 See 18 U.S.C. § 3731 (1982 & Supp IV 1986)(government may not appeal where
reprosecution would be barred by double jeopardy). See also Bullington v. Missouri, 451
U.S. 430, 446 (1981) (double jeopardy protects defendant from imposition of death pen-
alty at second trial wherejury at first trial imposed sentence of life imprisonment); Burks
v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 10 (1978)(double jeopardy prohibits retrial of defendant
whose conviction is reversed for insufficiency of evidence).
Reviewability ofjury verdicts, even if allowed, would be difficult in practice. Secrecy
in the jury's proceedings prevents lawyers and others from finding out the gist of the
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Given this lack of accountability, the requirement of impartiality
stands as one of the few and one of the prime safeguards insuring
that a jury will reach a fair and just result.
The law has been less than clear as to what is meant by imparti-
ality. Platitudes about its value abound, but giving content to this
concept has proven more difficult and challenging. The difficulty
springs from the fact that all adults have beliefs, values, and
prejudices which make impartiality in the tabula rasa sense impossi-
ble. The challenge is to define impartiality in a way that is both ac-
ceptable to the legal system and takes into account the moral,
political, economic, and psychological baggage that prospective ju-
rors bring with them.
The difficulty and challenge involved in identifying the compo-
nents of impartiality is compounded by the fact that trial lawyers do
not seek impartial jurors. 7 This observation is not so much an ex-
pression of cynicism as one of reality. Lawyers would do their cli-
ents a not easily explained disservice if they rejected ajuror believed
to be disposed to their side in favor of one thought to be neutral. It
is each attorney's responsibility to discover and to challenge, either
for cause or peremptorily, jurors who are biased towards the oppo-
sition. There is no obligation to excuse jurors believed to favor
one's own side.8 By the adroit use of challenges, each side strikes
those jurors thought to be most partial to the opposition. The ques-
tion that needs to be asked is whether, after this subtraction, the
discussion in the jury room. See United States v. Davila, 704 F.2d 749 (5th Cir. 1983);
United States v. Barber, 668 F.2d 778, 786-87 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 829 (1982).
See generally Harnsberger, Amend Canon 23 or Reverse Opinion 109, 51 A.B.A.J. 157 (1965);
Palmer, Post Trial Interview ofJurors in the Federal Courts-A Lawyer's Dilemma, 6 Hous. L.
REV. 290 (1968). This secrecy combined with the rule that jurors cannot impeach their
verdict serves to frustrate attempts to determine whether jurors acted rationally. See
McDonald v. Pless, 238 U.S. 264 (1915); United States v. Weiner, 578 F.2d 757 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 981 (1978); FED. R. EvID. 606(b). See generally Note, Impeach-
ment ofJury Verdicts, 53 MARQ. L. REV. 258 (1970).
6 A verdict of guilty cannot be overturned on appeal if, "after viewing the evidence
in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found
the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Jackson v. Virginia,
443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)(emphasis in original).
7 See, e.g., J. FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL 121-23 (1949)(citing sources); Fahringer, In
the Valley of the Blind: A Primer on Jury Selection in a Criminal Case, 43 LAw & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 116, 117 (1980); Kuhn,Jury Discrimination: The Next Phase, 41 S. CAL. L. REV. 235,
286 (1968).
8 It is probably improper for an attorney to fail to reveal juror biases which would
clearly justify disqualification for cause, such as that the juror is related to a party or has
a financial interest in the case, known to the attorney but not to opposing counsel or the
court. See In re Shon, 262 A.D. 225, 28 N.Y.S.2d 872 (1941)(upholding disbarment of
attorney for, inter alia, permitting two men with whom he was personally acquainted to
sit on jury without advising court or opposing counsel of relationship).
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remainder is an impartialjury. If so, it is the result of fortuity rather
than the conscious search for impartial jurors.
The view that an impartial jury will emerge from the elimina-
tion of jurors partial to the opposition is based on a questionable
equating of impartiality with the absence of partiality. Additional
qualities may be required of our ideal juror. Although it may not be
technically accurate to refer to these as qualities of impartiality, they
are personality characteristics, mind sets, values, and orientations
which contribute to impartial decision making.
Even the modest goal of eliminating partial jurors is difficult to
achieve in practice. It assumes equal access to information about
jurors and equally adept attorneys on each side. These assump-
tions, already suspect, have become more so as a result of the in-
creasing tendency to enlist trained behavioral scientists to help
identify jurors with subconscious predispositions for or against a
party's side.9 By conducting demographic studies and background
investigations of jurors, analyzing their psychological profiles, and
observing paralinguistic cues and body language during voir dire,
these experts attempt to predict which jurors will favor which party.
In one sense this is not new: lawyers have always sought, usually on
the basis of hunch or intuition, to choose favorably disposed jurors.
What is different is that the social scientists, with their more sophis-
ticated techniques and more rigorous methodologies, are more
likely to succeed.10 By converting what was an "art" into a "sci-
ence," the social scientists increase the threat that a partial jury will
be impanelled. While in theory the advances in social science meth-
odology could be used to further the objective of impanelling an
impartial jury, to date the opposite has probably occurred.'"
There are two critical steps in the search for an impartial jury.
9 See generally NATIONAL JURY PROJECT, JJRYWORK: SYSTEMATIC TECHNIQUES (2d ed.
1987); McConahay, Mullin & Frederick, The Uses of Social Science in Trials with Political
Overtones: The Trial of Joan Little, 41 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 205 (1977); Schulman,
Shaver, Colman, Emrich, & Christie, Recipefor aJury, PSYCHOLOGY TODAY, May 1973, at
37; Note, The Constitutional Need for Discovery of Pre-Voir Dire Juror Studies, 49 S. CAL. L. REV.
597 (1976). Both wealthy parties, who can afford to pay those experts, and political
activists, whose cause attracts volunteers, have used the assistance of social scientists.
10 Some commentators have questioned whether social scientists are in fact effective.
See, e.g., Berman & Sales, A Critical Evaluation of the Systematic Approach toJury Selection, 4
CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 219 (1977); Saks, Scientific Jury Selection: Social Scientists Can't Rig
Juries, PSYCHOLOGY TODAY, Jan. 1976, at 48. Regardless of the present ability of social
scientists to pick a jury, however, at some point, as their theoretical understanding of
human behavior increases and their practical ability to identify subconsciously biased
jurors does likewise, the courts will have to face the issues raised by their involvement in
jury selection. Even at present, the question is one of degree, as social scientists in-
crease the probability that a jury which is not impartial will hear the case.
11 See Etzioni, Creating an Imbalance, 10 TRIAL 28 (1974).
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First, a workable definition of impartiality must be formulated.
What does the legal system mean when it uses the term? What
should it mean? Can the qualities which make for an impartial juror
be identified? This Article will address these issues by first review-
ing common law conceptions of impartiality and relevant Supreme
Court decisions. Neither the common law nor the Court has ade-
quately dealt with the concept, and an alternative approach based
on a more psychologically sophisticated view of human nature, as
well as on the underlying theoretical goals of the legal system in
seeking an impartial jury, will be offered.
After the qualities of an impartial juror are identified, the next
step is to find such jurors. As the adversary system operates, law-
yers cannot realistically be expected to perform this task. The re-
sponsibility must be that of the judges. 12 However, at present they
lack adequate tools to discharge this responsibility. Social science
methodology, currently used by trial attorneys to frustrate the
search for an impartial jury, holds the potential for allowing judges
to impanel an impartial jury.
II. HISTORICAL CONCEPTIONS OF THE IMPARTIAL JURY
A. COMMON LAW ORIGINS
Scholars have traced the historical roots of the jury to a variety
of sources.13 For present purposes, it is not necessary to resolve the
debate over the origins of the jury. In England, the jury system ap-
pears to have replaced trial by ordeal,' 4 by which accused persons
12 "The obligation to impanel an impartial jury lies in the first instance with the trial
judge .... " Rosales-Lopez v. United States, 451 U.S. 182, 189 (1981).
13 In what is probably the most authoritative work on the subject, Forsyth traces the
jury's origin to the various modes of trial developed by Anglo-Saxons and Anglo-
Normans. W. FORSYTH, HISTORY OF TRIAL BY JURY (1852). Forsyth suggests that the
jury system resulted from an evolutionary process; thus, no precise point in history for
its initial use can be identified. See also W. CORNISH, supra note 3, at 10-12; P. DEVLIN,
supra note 3, at 3-14; Eastman, The History of Trial by Jury, 3 NAT'L. B. J. 87 (1945);
Thayer, The Jury and Its Development, 5 HARV. L. REV. 249 (1892); Warner, The Development
of Trial by Jury, 26 TENN. L. REV. 459 (1959).
14 See W. FORSYTH, supra note 13, at 80-81. There were several forms of ordeals, all
based on the religious premise that God would protect the innocent. One consisted of
the accused's carrying hot iron for a certain distance. The accused's hands were then
wrapped in bandages. After three days the bandages were removed. If the wounds had
healed, the accused was pronounced innocent. A second and related form of ordeal
based on the same healing principle entailed removing a stone from boiling water. In
another form of ordeal, a defendant was immersed in water. If the water rejected the
defendant's body, indicated by its floating, the defendant was deemed guilty. A defend-
ant whose body sank was deemed innocent. In a final form of ordeal, the ordeal of the
"accursed morsel," the accused had to swallow a piece of bread while praying that it
would choke him if he were guilty. If the defendant choked on the bread or was unable
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proved their innocence by surviving some form of torture, and trial
by battle,' 5 wherein the parties established the superiority of their
respective positions through combat.I" Conceding that both trial by
ordeal and trial by battle were suspect means of fair dispute resolu-
tion, it is not clear why it was thought that group decision making by
untrained lay persons "unaccustomed to severe intellectual exercise
or protracted thought," 17 the jury system, would yield better results
than, for example, decision making by experienced, educated
judges. 18 One could speculate that the preference for juries re-
flected a distrust of one person rule,'9 a fear that judges appointed
and/or paid by the state would favor state interests over those of the
defendant, 20 and a confidence in the superiority of the common
sense views of ordinary citizens over the technical methods of a legal
to swallow it cleanly, it was taken as a sign of guilt. The religious sanction for trial by
ordeal was undermined in 1215 when Pope Innocent III forbade clergy from further
involvement. See F. HELLER, THE SIXTH AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION 5 (1969).
15 W. FORSYTH, supra note 13 at 86-97, 202-03. As in trial by ordeal, trial by battle
had a religious underpinning: God would allow the righteous to prevail. Many were
apparently not convinced, and those who were able to recruit "champions" could have
them fight in their stead.
16 A third form of trial also existed-trial by compurgation. Judgment was based on
the testimony of compurgators, who swore not to their knowledge of the facts but rather
to the credibility of the accused. If a sufficient number of compurgators, usually 12,
vouched for an accused's truthfulness, the accused was entitled to an acquittal unless
more swore against him or her. See W. FORSYTH, supra note 13, at 72-84. The obvious
deficiency of trial by compurgation was its suceptibility to perjury.
17 P. DEVLIN, supra note 3, at 4.
18 Juror decisionmaking may not have been an unwelcome development to judges.
Jurors, because of their relative anonymity, can protect judges from reaction to unpopu-
lar decisions. After service, jurors melt back into the community from which they came.
See United States ex rel. McCann v. Adams, 126 F.2d 774, 775-76 (2d Cir. 1942). Were it
not for the jury, the more visible and permanent judge might become a lightning rod for
any public dissatisfaction with a verdict.
The choice between judge and jury is not insignificant. In their study of the Ameri-
can jury, Kalven and Zeisel found that judges and jurors rendered different decisions in
approximately 25% of the cases examined. See H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN
JURY ch. 5 (1966). In most instances the jury was more lenient than thejudge. Id. at 59.
An even greater disparity between judge and jury was found by Baldwin and McCon-
ville. J. BALDWIN & N. MCCONVILLE, JURY TRIALS 46 (1977).
19 Fear of unchecked power may have been a particularly acute concern in the United
States and may have been a major factor in its decision to preserve the jury system. See
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968). As a practical matter, a twelve person
jury will be more difficult to subvert or bribe than a single judge, particularly if a unani-
mous verdict is required. See Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972) (unanimous jury
verdicts not constitutionally required); Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356
(1972)(same). Less cynically, group decision making may be more effective than individ-
ual decision making, for members of the group bring to the jury a wider variety of exper-
iences and perspectives. See Joiner, From the Bench in THE JURY SYSTEM IN AMERICA: A
CRITICAL OVERVIEW (R. Simon ed. 1975).
20 See 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *349; P. DEVLIN, supra note 3, at 158-60.
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logician. 21 The true explanation lies more in history. The first ju-
rors were chosen because of their status as witnesses. 22 They pos-
sessed personal knowledge of the events which gave rise to the legal
dispute, and consequently were thought to be best positioned to ad-
judicate it.23
Not until a relatively late stage in the evolution of the jury did
presentation of evidence to persons unacquainted with the facts re-
place decision making by persons who knew the facts. 24 As society
became more complex, it was less realistic to expect members of the
community to know all the facts necessary for a fair resolution of a
dispute.25 In some instances the twelve person jury could not ac-
commodate all who had information bearing on the case. It became
necessary to examine witnesses who were not part of thejury. Once
this practice of questioning witnesses began, it was logical to extend
it to all witnesses. Thus there was no longer a need for witnesses to
serve on the jury. This development had the serendipitous effect of
eliminating from the jury persons whose familiarity with the facts
may have compromised their impartiality.
With the transition of jurors from fact knowers to fact finders
came a corresponding concern that jurors be impartial. Otherwise,
there was the danger that their verdict might be based on personal
favoritism rather than on the evidence. The ideal juror was thought
to be one who was not acquainted with the parties and their wit-
nesses and who had no knowledge of the facts and no interest, fi-
nancial or otherwise, in the outcome of the case.
21 See Duncan, 391 U.S. at 156 ("If the defendant preferred the common sense judg-
ment of a jury to the more tutored but perhaps less sympathetic reaction of the single
judge, he was to have it.").
22 p. DEVLIN, supra note 3, at 5-8. W. FORSYTH, supra note 13, at 54. It is most likely
that the practice of swearing jurors originated in their function as witnesses. P. DEVLIN,
supra note 3, at 5.
23 See W. FORSYTH, supra note 13, at 126-28; W. CORNISH, supra note 3, at 10-12. See
also Hassett, A Jury's Pre-Trial Knowledge in Historical Perspective: The Distinction Between Pre-
Trial Information and "Prejudicial" Publicity, 43 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 155 (1980).
English juries were never left totally to their own devices in determining facts.
Judges were permitted to comment on the evidence, thereby giving the jurors the bene-
fit of their experience and insight. Of course, the jurors were not obligated to follow the
advice of the judge. See Sunderland, The Inefficiency of the American Jury, 13 MIcH. L. REV.
302, 305 (1915). This practice of allowingjudicial comment on the evidence was drasti-
cally limited or abandoned in the American colonies. Id. at 307.
24 See W. CORNISH, supra note 3, at 11, 275. A number of intermediary stages oc-
curred in this metamorphasis. At one point, a mixed jury, consisting of both witnesses
and persons ignorant of the facts, was employed. See V. HANS & N. VIDMAR, JUDGING
THE JURY 27 (1986).




The concept of impartiality as an a priori lack of knowledge
about or interest in the case was encapsulized in Lord Coke's formu-
lation equating impartiality with "indifference. '26 The latter term,
however, was ill chosen. Jurors should not be indifferent in the
sense of not caring, and being satisfied to reach a verdict by a flip of
the coin or roll of the dice. They should not be indifferent to the
demands ofjustice. More accurately, Coke was concerned with neu-
trality: prior to hearing the evidence, jurors should not be inclined
to either side.
Even as so redefined, the value of "indifference" should not be
overrated. More critical than an initial indifference is the willing-
ness and ability to set aside any pretrial partiality and listen to the
evidence with an open mind. Detachment, open mindedness, and
objectivity in fact evaluation are the roots of neutrality.27 In their
deliberations, impartial jurors must resolve not to let their pretrial
lack of indifference affect the fairness of their verdict.
Coke's full statement required an impartial juror to be "indif-
ferent as he stands unsworn." 28 In terms of this temporal vantage
point, Coke's statement is incorrect as applied to a criminal trial. At
the outset of a prosecution jurors are not supposed to be impartial.
The presumption of innocence demands that they be biased in favor
of the accused. It is the state's obligation to overcome this institu-
tionally created bias in favor of the defendant by proof beyond a
reasonable doubt.29 As thus conceived, the concept of impartiality
must be read in the context of the Anglo-American criminal justice
system. In a different legal order in which, for example, a defendant
and the state started on an equal footing or in which the accused was
presumed guilty, impartiality might take on a different meaning.
At some point, presumably after introduction, consideration,
and discussion of the evidence, jurors must commit to one side's
position in order to reach a verdict. Permanently neutral jurors will
produce a hung jury. In a sense, however, a hung jury is a victory
for a defendant, who can return home and avoid prison. This out-
26 E. COKE, COMMENTARY UPON LITrLETON § 155(b) (London 19th ed. 1832), quoted
in Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 154 (1879). The Supreme Court continues to
cite the Coke formulation. See, e.g., Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28, 32 (1986).
27 See A. MONTEFIORE, NEUTRALITY AND IMPARTIALITY 1-33 (1975).
28 E. COKE, supra note 26, at § 155b.
29 See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970). Because of the presumption of innocence
and the state's burden to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, it is improper to create
a mandatory presumption which has the effect of shifting to the defendant the burden of
proof regarding an element of the crime. Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 (1979).
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come reveals another institutional bias within the criminal justice
system. In addition to the presumption of innocence, the require-
ment that a prosecutor prove a defendant's guilt beyond a reason-
able doubt skews the inquiry in favor of the accused. Ajury which is
equally persuaded by the state and the defense or is "indifferent" to
the two sides' positions is legally bound to rule against the state.
The legal system demands that the jury convert its indifference into
a partiality for the accused.
A final deficiency in Lord Coke's maxim is that, while it may
identify an ideal or at least one important aspect of the ideal of im-
partiality, it does not tell how to attain that ideal. The common law
did recognize that the matter should not be left solely to the courts;
parties and their attorneys should be part of the process. To re-
move from the jury persons who were not impartial, the law permit-
ted each side to challenge individual jurors as well as the entire
array of jurors. 30
C. A JURY OF ONE'S PEERS
Some assert that there is a right to a jury of one's peers. The
apparent source of this claim is the reference to "judicum parium"
in the Magna Carta.3s In practice it seems to have meant that one
should not be judged by those of inferior status.3 2 Thus, it was a
one way proposition: the upper classes could judge the lower but
not vice versa. The English system achieved this objective to an ex-
tent by making land ownership a qualification for jury service.3 3 In
the less class conscious "new world," peers were defined as persons
of the same legal status as the accused.34
Regardless of definition, the requirement of a jury of one's
30 See W. FORSYTH, supra note 13, at 159-60, 175-80, 230-33; W. CORNISH, supra note
3, at 47-52. For a history of the development of challenges in both England and the
United States, see Moore, Voir Dire Examination ofJurors, 16 GEO. L.J. 438 (1928).
31 See Marshall, The Judgment of One's Peers: Some Aims and Ideals of Jury Trial in N.
WALKER, THE BRITISH JURY SYSTEM 1, 5 (1974). Forsyth, however, maintains that
"judicum parium" did not refer to the jury. W. FORSYTH, supra note 13, at 108-14. See
also B. KEENEY, JUDGMENT BY PEERS (1952); J. VAN DYKE, JURY SELECTION PROCEDURES
ch. 1 (1977y; LaRue, AJury of One's Peers, 33 WASH. & LEE L. RE.'. 841 (1976).
32 See Marshall, supra note 31, at 5.
33 See P. DEVLIN, supra note 3, at 17. The property requirement for jury service was
not formally abolished until the CriminalJustice Act, 1972, ch. 71. As a practical matter,
the amount of property which had to be owned was so minimal that the requirement had
ceased to have a significant impact long before passage of the Act.
34 See Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 308 (1879)("The very idea of ajury is
a body of men composed of the peers or equals of the person whose rights it is selected
or summoned to determine; that is, of his neighbors, fellows, associates, persons having
the same legal status in society as that which he holds."). A jury of one's peers is not
specifically guaranteed in the United States Constitution.
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peers does not seem to be directly related to impartiality. Indeed,
to the extent that one's peers can be expected to empathize with
one's acts, the result is a favorably disposed jury, rather than a jury
of neutral disposition. 35 Conversely, a jury can be impartial even if
it does not contain any of the defendant's peers.
Some commentators have suggested that only a jury of peers
can fully understand the acts of the accused.36 These commentators
tend to use "peers" in the sense of persons who share a common
racial, ethnic, or cultural background with the accused. Besides the
practical impossibility of amassing such jurors, the implicit but ques-
tionable assumption is that ajuror is incapable of understanding the
actions of a person of a different background. Such an assumption
overlooks the role of the attorney in presenting the evidence in a
comprehensible light. Furthermore, the amount of understanding
necessary to decide a case impartially may require sympathy and
empathy but not necessarily an identity of common experience.
Perhaps for these reasons, the concept of ajury of peers has not
been taken literally.37 An alien juvenile charged with an act of ter-
rorism, for example, would not be entitled to a jury of youthful for-
eigners who were themselves terrorists. Nor is a black defendant
entitled to an all black jury,38 despite occasional academic argu-
ments to the contrary.39
The inclusion of a defendant's peers on the jury may to some
extent legitimate an adverse verdict. A defendant, as well as the
class of which the defendant is a member, will be more likely to ac-
cept the verdict of a jury of peers than the verdict of a jury from
which peers have been excluded. Besides legitimating verdicts,
peers may provide guidance and insight to other jurors and thereby
facilitate impartial decision making.
35 See J. VAN DYKE, supra note 31, at ch. 2. Such a jury might also be less likely to
empathize with the victim to the extent that such empathy influences a jury's considera-
tion. Id. at 11.
36 Professor LaRue suggests that peers should include "those who have enough in
common with the accused, or who have enough sympathy for the accused, to be able to
give a realistic evaluation of his story." LaRue, supra note 31, at 867. See also V. HANS &
N. VIDMAR, supra note 24, at 50.
37 See Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313 (1879)(black defendants had no right to have
blacks on either petit jury which tried them or grand jury which indicted them). At an
early point in United States history, however, defendants were entitled to some jurors of
their own background. See, e.g., United States v. Carnot, 25 F. Cas. 297, (C.C.D.C. 1824)
(No. 14,726); LaRue, supra note 31, at 850-62.
38 Rives, 100 U.S. at 323.
3 ) See Note, The Case for Black Juries, 79 YALE LJ. 531 (1970). For case authority for
the general proposition, see infra note 60.
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D. IMPARTIAL JURY V. IMPARTIAL JURORS
Although the terms "impartial jury" and "impartial jurors"
have been used interchangeably up to this point, there is a differ-
ence between the two. Intuitively, it would seem that an impartial
jury must be composed of impartial jurors. Some courts and com-
mentators, however, maintained that there can be partial jurors on
an impartial jury.40 This apparent anomaly is based on a concept of
checks and balances. Two jurors with competing biases will force
each other to confront the merits of their opposing positions,
thereby contributing to a full airing of views and impartial decision
making.
The validity of the theory is suspect. The assumption is that
either prejudices are amenable to persuasion or, if not, will offset
each other.4 1 This is not necessarily so. Some biases are firmly held
and are not susceptible to displacement. Willingness to be per-
suaded by the arguments of others will also be a function of the
stubbornness of the juror, regardless of the strength of the bias.
Nor do conflicting biases cancel each other in a criminal trial; a pro-
defense juror who will always vote for acquittal is not offset by-a pro-
prosecution juror who will always vote for conviction. In such a sit-
uation, the defendant cannot be convicted in a jurisdiction which
requires a unanimous verdict.42
To try to construct a jury with offsetting biases would, in any
event, be a formidable task. It would be virtually impossible for a
judge to determine when ajury had the appropriate mix of biases. 43
More fundamentally, the checks and balances approach to jury com-
position assumes that the legal system will be served by the seating
of prejudiced jurors. Thus, a person's political, moral, social, and
economic views, far from being undesirable baggage, are viewed as
indispensable qualities of the ideal juror. However, although a full
range of life experiences will contribute to a robust and open dia-
logue in the jury room, a line must be drawn. Jurors should not be
40 See Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 234 (1978)("[T]he counterbalancing of biases
is critical to the accurate application of the common sense of the community to the facts
of any given case."). See also R. HASTIE, S. PENROD & N. PENNINGTON, INSIDE THEJURY 8
(1983); Duff& Findlay,Jury Vetting- TheJury UnderAttack, 3 LEGAL STUD. 159, 164 (1983);
Kuhn, supra note 7 at 242, 287 (1968); See generally J. VAN DYKE, supra note 31.
41 See People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 258, 266-67, 583 P.2d 748, 755, 148 Cal. Rptr.
890, 896 (1978).
42 The Supreme Court has held that non-unanimous verdicts may be constitutionally
acceptable. Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972); Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S.
356 (1972). For a discussion of non-unanimous jury verdicts, see infra notes 132-135
and accompanying text.
43 See Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 177-78 (1986).
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permitted to base votes on their biases rather than on the evidence.
Judges must insist that jurors not allow their biases to irrationally
affect the verdict.
A diversity of biases is desirable, however, if jurors must make
primarily value rather than factual judgments. Pornography, for ex-
ample, is defined in terms of a community standard.44 The biases of
the community are in effect the legal standard, and a jury reflective
of the various biases in the community is the objective.
The goal in theory is an impartial jury, not necessarily a jury of
impartial jurors.45 The sum may be greater than its parts. Never-
theless, it would be unwise to ignore the individual characteristics of
each juror. As a practical matter, few lawyers have the ability, train-
ing, or skill to predict the dynamics of juror interaction. To analyze
an individual juror's proclivities is difficult enough. Moreover, no
attorney would ever deliberately accept a juror predisposed to the
opposition. Ajury containing two or more persons with conflicting
biases results when each side has failed to excuse a juror favorable
to the other side.46 If only one side slips, the non-impartial juror
threatens to undermine the impartiality of the jury. Accordingly,
the search for an impartial jury becomes in practice the search for
impartial jurors.
Although less likely, a jury composed entirely of impartial ju-
rors may still not result in an impartial jury. Jurors who may be
impartial in regard to the parties or the issues may be antagonistic
to each other; this antagonism may defeat a consensus. 47 Some im-
partial jurors, moreover, may lack the strength of character to hold
44 See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
45 Judicial statements can, however, be found to the effect that an impartial jury con-
sists of twelve impartial jurors. See, e.g., Mares v. State, 83 N.M. 225, 490 P.2d 667, 668
(1971); King v. State, 129 Tex. Crim. 371, 87 S.W.2d 726,727 (1935); Hillyard v. State,
116 Tex. Crim. 567, 34 S.W.2d 601, 602 (1931).
46 This may not be the result of negligence. Each side, for example, may have ex-
hausted its supply of peremptory challenges, and the bias of a juror may not be suffi-
ciently clear or established to permit the judge to sustain a challenge for cause.
47 See V. HANS & N. VIDMAR, supra note 24, at 108-09; Saltzburg & Powers, Peremptory
Challenges and the Clash between Impartiality and Group Representation, 41 MD. L. REV. 337,
354-55 (1982). A member of an actual jury has offered an interesting perspective in this
regard:
I do not suppose many attornies have the opportunity to consider how the jury
members might evaluate each other; I recall thinking facetiously during the Panther
voir dire that we who had already been chosen ought to have some say in who our
fellow jurors would be. This was absurd, of course, but jurors do have to size up
and deal with these varied strangers (and, in small communities, friends and ac-
quaintances and enemies) regardless of their mutual opinions.
Kennebeck, From the Jury Box in THE JURY SYSTEM IN AMERICA: A CRITICAL OVERVIEW
233, 244 (R. Simon ed. 1975).
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out against group pressure,48 thereby destroying the impartiality of
the jury. Even if impartial jurors will result in an impartial jury, a
jury composed of homogeneous jurors may not be optimal. Homo-
geneity, with which impartiality is sometimes confused, may prevent
the full discussion vital to the decision making process. Fortunately
for the legal system, impartiality does not require homogeneity.
E. THE ROLE OF HISTORY
This cursory review of common law conceptions of impartiality
will not satisfy the historian. Nonetheless, as shortsighted as it
would be to ignore history, to justify the continuation of suspect
practices solely on the basis of history would be equally mis-
guided.49 Although the Supreme Court continues to stress the need
for juries to guard against "the corrupt or overzealous prosecutor
and against the compliant, biased, or eccentric judge," 50 the need
48 For example, in an instructive experiment, Asch asked groups to judge the length
of lines. All but one of the participants were directed to deliberately misjudge the
length. Each of these confederates expressed in turn the same incorrect opinion. Fi-
nally, the true subject was asked his opinion. 37% of the critical subjects concurred in
the incorrect judgment. Members of a control group, not subjected to group pressure,
made virtually no mistakes. Asch, Effects of Group Pressure Upon the Modification and Distor-
tion ofJudgments, reprinted in GROUPS, LEADERSHIP, AND MEN 177 (H. Guetzkow ed. 1951).
See also S. ASCH, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY ch. 16 (1952); Crutchfield, Conformity and Character,
10 AM. PSYCHOLOGY 191 (1955). These experiments are discussed in Note, Personality
Testsfor ProspectiveJurors, 56 KY. LJ. 832, 838-40 (1968). Citing the Asch study, Kalven &
Zeisel suggest that for one or two jurors to disagree with the rest and cause a hung jury,
the minority must have the support of other jurors at the beginning of the deliberations.
H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, supra note 18, at 463. See also Pope v. Illinois, 107 S. Ct. 1918,
1928 (1987)("Since obscenity is by no means a neutral subject, and since the ascertain-
ment of a community standard is such a subjective task, the expression of individual
jurors' sentiments will inevitably influence the perceptions of other jurors, particularly
those who would normally be in the minority.").
49 See Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457 (1897):
It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that so it was laid down
in the time of Henry IV. It is still more revolting if the grounds upon which it was
laid down have vanished long since, and the rule simply persists from blind imita-
tion of the past.
Id. at 469. But see Younger, Unlawful Peremptory Challenges, 7 LrriGATiON 23 (1880):
The real question is whether to tinker with a system, be it jury selection or anything
else, that has done the job for centuries. We stand on the shoulders of our ances-
tors, as Burke said. It is not so much that the past is always worth preserving, he
argues, but rather that is is with infinite caution that any man ought to venture upon
pulling down an edifice which has answered in any tolerable degree for ages the
common purposes of society ....
Id. at 56.
50 Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968). See also Williams v. Florida, 399
U.S. 78, 100 (1970)(purpose ofjury is to prevent oppression by government). If these
concerns are genuine, it would make more sense to root out the offending individuals
via impeachment or indictment where appropriate.
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has arguably lessened over time.5' Today there is a greater mer-
itocracy in the selection ofjudges, who are now less likely to be the
pawns of the ruling class. Perhaps more significant, becausejudicial
appointments based on political patronage still sometimes occur, is
the greater public visibility of courtroom proceedings. Newspaper
reporters regularly attend trials and welcome the opportunity to ex-
pose judicial incompetence. In any event, given the awe and respect
with which jurors regard judges,52 it is probably unrealistic to ex-
pect them to expose, even if they were aware of it, judicial bias, ec-
centricity, or complacency. Nor does the legal system necessarily
want jurors to set free a guilty defendant because of their negative
reaction to the judge's character.
As for prosecutors, judges are more qualified than jurors to
perceive corruption or overzealousness on their part and better
positioned to deal with it. Moreover, most prosecutors today are
more concerned with limiting than expanding their caseload. The
sheer number of possible cases and the ever present backlog man-
date careful screening. 53 Practical realities thus deter vindictive
prosecutions. Furthermore, the increased competence of police in-
vestigation, coupled with their recognized discretion not to arrest in
doubtful cases, 54 arguably diminishes the need for the protection
afforded by the jury.
The qualifications of the typical juror have changed over time.
Jurors today are better educated and better informed. The evidence
which they must evaluate, however, has also changed. Complex fac-
tual cases and the jargonistic testimony of expert witnesses are no
longer exceptional. A more sophisticated and intelligent juror is
needed to understand this evidence. In sum, while it is instructive
to examine the historical roots ofjury impartiality, final assessments
must be premised on the present role of the jury and the demands
of impartiality in light of that role.
51 See United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113, 1132 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
52 This view of the judge by jurors is not surprising. The judge sits in an elevated
position in the courtroom, cloaked in a black robe. All rise respectfully when the judge
enters or leaves. Thejury is charged to follow the judge's instructions. Lawyers defer to
judge's rulings, and the judge has the power to hold attorneys in contempt. In this
environment, where all make a public show of respect to the judge, there is no reason to
believe jurors will behave differently.
53 See generally La Fave, The Prosecutor's Discretion in the United States, 18 AM.J. COMP. L.
532 (1970); Uviller, The Virtuous Prosecutor in Quest of an Ethical Standard: Guidance from the
A.B.A., 71 MiCH. L. REV. 1145 (1973).
54 See generally K. DAVIS, POLICE DISCRETION (1975); W. LAFAVE, ARREST: THE DECI-
SION TO TAKE A SUSPECT INTO CUSTODY (1965).
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III. THE SUPREME COURT'S APPROACH TO JURY COMPOSITION:
IMPARTIALITY BY INDIRECTION
To a large extent, the Supreme Court has not directly ad-
dressed the question of jury impartiality. 55 Often the issue is sub-
sumed in a more general discussion of the attributes of a
constitutionally acceptablejury. The implicit assumption appears to
be that a jury which comports with general constitutional provisions
will be impartial. Like the assumption that the net effect of remov-
ing partial jurors will be an impartial jury, this seems questionable.
More significantly, it approaches the concept of impartiality by an
indirect route, failing to identify its specific components. Neverthe-
less, the Court's decisions raise provocative questions, provide in-
sight into the Court's thinking, and merit examination.
A. NON-DISCRIMINATION
The first Supreme Court cases to address the issue ofjury com-
position involved racial discrimination. In Strauder v. West Virginia56
the Supreme Court held that a West Virginia statute prohibiting
blacks from serving on juries violated the equal protection clause.57
A year after Strauder, the Court indicated in Neal v. Delaware58 that de
facto as well as de jure discrimination was illegal, and ostensibly,
that objective selection criteria, when applied consistently yielded
all white juries, did not satisfy the Constitution. 59 The Court has
55 The Court has on occasion specifically declined to formulate a test of impartiality.
See e.g., United States v. Wood, 299 U.S. 123, 145-46 (1936).
56 100 U.S. 303 (1880).
57 This principle of non-discrimination applies to both petit and grand juries. Alex-
ander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625, 626 n.3 (1972); Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187
(1946); Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128 (1940); Pierre v. Louisiana, 306 U.S. 354 (1939);
Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587 (1935); 18 U.S.C. § 243 (1982). For a critical analysis
of the historical underpinnings of the jury discrimination cases, see Avins, The Fourteenth
Amendment and Jury Discrimination: The Original Understanding, 27 FED. B. J. 257 (1967).
58 103 U.S. 370 (1881).
59 See also Sims v. Georgia, 389 U.S. 404 (1967)(statement by jury commissioner that
he did not discriminate injury selection failed to rebut statistical disparity which created
inference of discrimination); Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 545 (1967)(same); Eubanks v.
Louisiana, 356 U.S. 584 (1958)(neutral selection system which operated so as to system-
atically exclude blacks from jury service was unconstitutional and was not saved by testi-
mony of judges that they had not discriminated in selection of jurors). Congress has
codified its commitment to non-discrimination in the selection of grand and petit jurors
in the FederalJury Selection and Service Act of 1968, 28 U.S.C. § 1862 (1982)
Proving discrimination is often difficult. The defendant must generally show that he
or she is a member of a cognizable group singled out for differential treatment and that
members of the defendant's class have regularly not been summoned for jury service
over an extended period of time. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 93-95 (1986);
Casteneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 494 (1977). But see sources cited infra note 64 for
the position that defendant need not be a member of the excluded class in order to
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taken care to note, however, that there is no affirmative right to be
tried by a jury composed in whole or in part of members of one's
own race.
60
That the Court's concern was not limited to the exclusion of
blacks was illustrated by Hernandez v. Texas.6' The defendant alleged
that persons of Mexican descent had been excluded from jury ser-
vice. Rejecting the state's argument that the equal protection clause
was restricted to the prevention of discrimination against Negroes, 62
the Court held that the systematic exclusion of any identifiable class
of the community violated the fourteenth amendment.
Sex discrimination was at issue in Taylor v. Louisiana,63 where a
state statute exempted from jury duty women who did not file a writ-
ten request to be allowed to serve. 64 The Court ruled that this sys-
tematic exclusion of women from jury panels was
unconstitutional. 65 Rather than relying primarily on an equal pro-
tection analysis, as it had in previous decisions, the Court declared
that "the exclusion of women from jury venires deprives a criminal
defendant of his Sixth Amendment right to trial by an impartial jury drawn
from a fair cross section of the community." 66
1. Non-Discrimination and Impartiality
The Taylor Court probably intended to place the emphasis in its
statement on the "fair cross section" requirement, 67 but the lan-
challenge the discrimination. The Court has also looked critically on selection processes
which provide the opportunity for discrimination. See, e.g., Alexander v. Louisiana, 405
U.S. 625 (1972)(racial designation on jury questionnaire); Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S.
559 (1953)(color coded juror cards for black and white prospective jurors).
60 Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 84-85 (19$6); Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313
(1879); Bush v. Kentucky, 107 U.S. 110, 117 (1883).
61 347 U.S. 475 (1954).
62 Id. at 477-78.
63 419 U.S. 522 (1975).
64 Interestingly, the defendant in the case was a male, and thus not of the excluded
class. The Court as a preliminary matter ruled that this feature of the case did not dis-
qualify defendant from raising his objection. Id. at 526. See also Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S.
493 (1972)(white defendant permitted to challenge conviction on ground that- blacks
had been excluded from jury service); Thiel v. Southern Pacific Co., 328 U.S. 217, 225
(1946) (unnecessary to determine whether defendant was member of economic class al-
legedly excluded).
65 In Strauder, the Court had, in dictum, suggested that jury service could constitu-
tionally be restricted to males. 100 U.S. at 310. See also Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57, 60
(196 1)(upholding statute granting women absolute exemption from jury duty). The
Court in Taylor rejected this view as one reflective of a time which had "long since
passed." 419 U.S. at 537.
66 Taylor, 419 U.S. at 535-36 (emphasis added).
67 The Court at various points in its opinion referred virtually exclusively to the fair
cross-section requirement. See id. at 530, 537-38.
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guage suggests that impartiality may also be important in the exclu-
sion cases.6 8 If this is true, one might ask how the Court reached
this conclusion. Perhaps the Court is of the view that a jury com-
posed of white males is by definition not impartial. The fact that the
Justices in these cases did not inquire into whether individual jurors
were in fact biased lends support to this thesis. The Court appears
to assume that any jury drawn only from the population of white
males would not or could not be impartial.69
It does not necessarily follow, however, that minorities and wo-
men are any less partial. Thus, the replacement of white male jurors
with such individuals is not a substitution of impartial jurors for par-
tial ones but rather a substitution of one partiality for another. Al-
ternatively, if white male jurors are by definition partial, perhaps the
Court believes that the integration of minorities and women into the
panel will render the jury impartial. There does not seem to be any
logical or psychological basis for expecting biased jurors to abandon
their prejudices because blacks or women are on a jury, although
the presence of blacks and women may inhibit overt expression of
racist or sexist attitudes. 70 On the other hand, there may be a basis
for believing that integration of the jury will increase the jury's im-
partiality. This conclusion rests on several assumptions: 1) that mi-
norities and women, like white males, are biased and prejudiced;
2) that their biases and prejudices are more or less reciprocal to
those of white males; and, therefore, 3) that their biases will expose,
offer rebuttal to, and ultimately cancel the biases of the white
males. 7 1
68 The Court's statement could be interpreted in any of three ways: (1) that defend-
ant was denied his right to a trial by jury; (2) that defendant was denied his right to ajury
which was impartial; or (3) that defendant was denied his right to an impartial jury
drawn from a cross-section of the community. The first alternative does not seem to be
indicated by the facts. The second alternative is explored in this section of the text. The
third alternative is examined in the next section.
69 See Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28, 39 (1986) (Brennan, J., concurring in part, dis-
senting in part) ("The reality of race relations in this country is such that we simply may
not presume impartiality .. "); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 309 (1880)("It
is well known that prejudices often exist against particular classes in the community,
which sway the judgment ofjurors, and which, therefore, operate in some cases to deny
to persons of those classes the full enjoyment of that protection which others enjoy.").
70 See Ashby,Juror Selection and the Sixth Amendment Right to an ImpartialJury, 11 CREIGH-
TON L. REV. 1137, 1139 (1978). Whether this inhibiting effect would alter voting pat-
terns is conjectural.
71 In Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187 (1946), the Court offered the following
analysis regarding the exclusion of women from juries:
It is said, however, that an all male panel drawn from the various groups within a
community will be as truly representative as if women were, included. The thought
is that the factors which tend to influence the action of women are the same as those
which influence the action of men-personality, background, economic status-and
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All three of the above assumptions are, of course, highly ques-
tionable. Moreover, if taken to their logical conclusion, they would
require an integrated jury in every trial, not simply the Court's ban
on exclusion from eligibility for jury service. Otherwise, a defend-
ant tried by a unintegrated jury would not receive the benefits of
integration, even though the jury was chosen from an integrated
pool. The most troublesome aspect of the analysis, however, is that
it rests on racial and sexual stereotyping which the Court in other
contexts has roundly condemned; 72 the Court appears to assume a
common biased viewpoint on the part of a class of individuals. Pre-
sumably the Court would not expect a juror to vote as a representa-
tive of the juror's class if that vote did not express the juror's
individual judgment. Perhaps the Court's preference for equal pro-
tection rather than impartial jury analysis, as well as its failure to
articulate a cohesive theory linking impartiality to class exclusion,
reflects reluctance to admit its own stereotypical biases about race,
ethnicity, sex, and other factors. 73
In Peters v. K/F74 Justice Marshall reformulated this thesis and
presented it in a less provocative guise:
When any large and identifiable segment of the community is ex-
cluded from jury service, the effect is to remove from the jury room
qualities of human nature and varieties of human experience, the range of
which is unknown and perhaps unknowable. It is not necessary to as-
sume that the excluded group will consistently vote as a class in order
to conclude, as we do, that its exclusion deprives the jury of a perspec-
tive on human events that may have unsuspected importance in any case
that may be presented. 75
not sex. Yet it is not enough to say that women when sitting as jurors neither act
nor tend to act as a class. Men likewise do not act as a class. But if the shoe were on
the other foot, who would claim that a jury was truly representative of the commu-
nity if all men were intentionally and systematically excluded from the panel? The
truth is that the two sexes are not fungible; a community made up exclusively of one
is different from a community composed of both; the subtle interplay of influence
one on the other is among the imponderables. To insulate the courtroom from
either may not in a given case make an iota of difference. Yet a flavor, a distinct
quality is lost if either sex is excluded.
Id. at 193-94.
72 See, e.g., Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976);
Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1975).
73 See Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.S. 589, 596 n.8. The Court in Ristaino stated "[i]n our
heterogeneous society policy as well as constitutional considerations militate against the
divisive assumption-as a per se rule-that justice in a court of law may turn upon the
pigmentation of skin, the accident of birth, or the choice of religion." Id. A more cyni-
cal, though similar, observation has been made about peremptory challenges: "The per-
emptory made without giving reason avoids trafficking in the core of truth in most
common stereotypes .... Babcock, Voir Dire: Preserving "Its Wonderful Power," 27 STAN.
L. REV. 545, 553 (1975).
74 407 U.S. 493 (1972).
75 Id. at 503-04 (emphasis added)(footnotes omitted).
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Whether "qualities of human nature," "varieties of.human experi-
ence," and "perspective[s] on human events" are mere euphemisms
for bias and prejudice is problematic. At a more basic level, Justice
Marshall may have lost sight of the goal of fair and just verdicts. It is
not so much nondiscrimination in jury selection which insures im-
partial decision making, but the selection of impartial jurors which
insures nondiscriminatory decision making.
2. Other Institutional Considerations
To analyze the Court's jury nondiscrimination decisions solely
in terms of their effect on impartiality is, however, to do the Justices
a disservice. Implicit and often explicit in these decisions is a recog-
nition that there are values at stake in addition to the rights of the
parties: "The injury is not limited to the defendant-there is injury
to the jury system, to the law as an institution, to the community at
large, and to the democratic ideal reflected in the processes of our
courts." 76
Perhaps most harmed are members of the excluded class, who
are stigmatized by the exclusion. If juries are composed of "solid
citizens," and if members of a class are not eligible for jury service,
it follows that members of that class are not "solid citizens." 77 Re-
jection for jury duty, thus, may reinforce and foster prejudices
against the excluded class. 78 Conversely, inclusion of these classes
on juries may help break down stereotypes.
From a slightly different perspective, exclusion denies members
of the excluded class their right and responsibility as citizens to par-
ticipate in the state created legal decision making process. The jury
system is an exercise in self-government, and thus a quintessentially
democratic institution. To place class limits on who may serve is to
substitute an oligarchic mode of decision making for a democratic
one. In this respect denial of the right of jury service is akin to de-
nial of the right to vote: both implicate the rightful, role of the citi-
zenry in governmental processes. 79 In addition, to the extent that
76 Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187, 195 (1946).
77 See Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 308 (1880).
78 In Strauder the Court noted:
The very fact the colored people are singled out and expressly denied by a statute
all right to participate in the administration of the law, as jurors, because of their
color, though they are citizens and may be in other respects fully qualified, is practi-
cally a brand upon them, affixed by the law; an assertion of their inferiority, and a
stimulant to that race prejudice which is an impediment to securing to individuals of
the race that equal justice which the law aims to secure to all others.
Id.
79 See Carter v. Jury Comm'n of Greene County, 396 U.S. 320, 330 (1970)("Whether
jury service be deemed a right, a privilege, or a duty, the State may no more extend it to
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through jury service citizens learn about the law, the operation of
the court system, and principles of fairness, justice, and equality,
excluded classes are denied this educational experience.
The state also has an interest in having all segments of society
eligible to participate in the jury system.80 Both the accused and
ordinary citizens are more likely to accept the legitimacy of verdicts
delivered by juries on which all members of society were at least
theoretically eligible to serve. If only certain groups are permitted
to serve, members of excluded groups may lack confidence in the
resulting verdicts, even if they appear fair on their face."' There will
always be suspicion about how a jury reaches its verdict. Opening
the jury to all serves a function akin to a "sunshine law,"8' 2 permit-
ting citizens to scrutinize the decision making process firsthand, as
well as to participate in it. No doubt satisfied with their own per-
formance, jurors should come away from their experience with a
heightened respect for the operation of the legal system as a whole.
Thus the nondiscrimination decisions are a partial means both of
bolstering public support and confidence in the jury system and of
increasing the likelihood of the verdict's acceptance. To achieve
these goals actual impartiality may not be as important as the ap-
pearance of impartiality. A nondiscriminatory selection system con-
tributes to that appearance.
3. Vindicating Society's Interests
Society, as represented by the state, also has an interest in im-
partial juries.8 3 Recognition of this interest is reflected in the fact
some of its citizens and deny it to others on racial grounds than it may invidiously dis-
criminate in the offering and withholding of the elective franchise.").
Jury participation is in one sense even more an exercise in participatory democracy
than voting. Voting is done in anonymity-voters step in the ballot box and record their
selections. They need not disclose or justify their votes to anybody. By contrast, while
the deliberations ofjurors are secret to the outside world, jurors must frequently defend
their positions to each other.
80 See Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24 (1965)(government need not consent to
defendant's waiver ofjury trial); Chicago Council of Lawyers v. Bauer, 371 F. Supp. 689,
691 (C.D. Ill. 1974), rev'd, 522 F.2d 242 (7th Cir. 1975), cert denied, 427 U.S. 912
(1976)("The right to a fair and impartial adjudication extends not only to criminal de-
fendants but also to the government and, through it, to society.").
81 See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 88-89 (1986); Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S.
522, 530 (1975); Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187, 195 (1946).
82 See generally Little & Tompkins, Open Govenment Laws: An Insider's View, 53 N.C.L.
REV. 451 (1975); Wickham, Let the Sun Sun Shine In! Open Meeting Legislation Can Be Our
Key to Closed Doors in State Local Government, 68 Nw. U.L. REV. 480 (1973).
83 See People v. Newsome, 110 Ill. App. 3d 1043, 443 N.E.2d 634, 637 (1982)(state,
as well as defendant, is entitled to an impartial jury). Accord People v. Guzman, 125
Misc.2d 457, 467, 478 N.Y.S.2d 455, 462 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1984).
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that the prosecution, as well as the defense, is allowed to challenge
jurors,8 4 although the right to an impartial jury is given by the Con-
stitution only to the accused.85 If, however, both sides are actually
seeking not impartial jurors but jurors partial to their sides,86 who
will ensure that society's interests in impartial juries, as well as the
interests of the excluded classes, are vindicated?
The parties have standing to assert the interests of society and
the excluded classes, as well as their own rights to an impartial
jury.87 Whether the former interests are vindicated, however, de-
pends on the losing party both appealing and raising the impartial-
ity issue. 8
A second possibility is to permit the excluded jurors to chal-
lenge their exclusion or to accord standing to an identifiable ex-
cluded group to bring an appropriate suit. Courts have allowed
class actions of this kind.8 9 These suits, however, are expensive and
time consuming, and their rarity attests to their inefficacy in preserv-
ing the impartial jury requirement in most cases. 90°
A third and more promising possibility is to enlist the aid of the
trial judge. In many jurisdictions, judges have already usurped the
84 See, e.g., FED. R. GRIM. P. 24(b). See generally J. VAN DYKE, supra note 31, at 150. See
also Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986)(discriminatory exercise of peremptory chal-
lenges by prosecutor violates equal protection clause). At common law the prosecutor's
formal right of peremptory challenge was abolished by statute in 1305. 33 Edw. 1, Stat.
4 (1305). In its stead, there developed the practice of allowing the prosecutor to ask
jurors to "stand aside," with the result that these jurors would not serve unless the
supply of acceptable jurors was exhausted. See W. CORNISH, supra note 3, at 48; W. FOR-
SYTH, supra note 13, at 232. Although there is no constitutional right of peremptory
challenge for either prosecution or defense, see Stilson v. United States, 250 U.S. 583,
586 (1919), the right is often granted by statute. See e.g., FED. R. GRIM. P. 24(b). The
prosecutor's right of peremptory challenge was recognized by the Supreme Court in
Hayes v. Missouiri, 120 U.S. 68, 70-71 (1887). The history of peremptory challenges,
both at common law and in the United States, is reviewed by the Supreme Court in
Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 212-20 (1965).
85 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
86 See supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text.
87 As a practical matter, whether the accused claims a vilation of personal rights or
asserts ajus tertii claim to vindicate the interest of the excluded class matters little. The
effect in either instance is to present the issue to the appellate court.
88 See Kaufman, A FairJury-The Essence ofJustice, 51 JUDICATURE 88 (1967). Kaufman
states:
[Slince the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted a century ago, the Supreme Court
has decided approximately three dozen cases involving alleged racial discrimination
[in regard to juries], and in most instances has found the claim of discrimination to
be true. But for each of these successful litigants there were thousands of defend-
ants who passively accepted the system.
Id.
89 See, e.g., Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346 (1970); Carter v.Jury Comm'n of Greene
County, 396 U.S. 320 (1970).
90 See Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 262 n.5 (1986).
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traditional attorney role in conducting voir dire.91 Courts no doubt
have statutory92 or inherent authority9" to excuse on their own mo-
tion biased jurors. Nonetheless, judges exercise this authority spar-
ingly. Perhaps they believe that jury challenges are so intricate a
part of trial strategy that the decisions properly belong to the attor-
neys. Alternatively, judges may believe that the adversary system
and the dictates ofjudicial neutrality require that they accept jurors
not challenged by either side. A court may also fear reversal if it
excuses a juror acceptable to both sides.94
Arguably, the trial court should take an active role in excusing
jurors perceived to lack the requisite impartiality.95 Such a role
would not compromise judicial neutrality, because the judge would
not be searching for partial jurors but seeking to eliminate them.
The delegation of this responsibility to the trial judge would ensure
that an impartial jury would be actively sought in every case. Part of
the problem in allocating this role to trial judges, however, is that
they presently lack adequate tools to determine whether a given ju-
ror is impartial.96
B. THE CROSS-SECTION REQUIREMENT
The discrimination cases discussed in the preceding section
may reflect a broader concern that jurors represent a cross-section
91 See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 24(a) (giving judges the authority to conduct voir dire).
See also Ham v. South Carolina, 409 U.S. 524, 527 (1973) (trial judge, though required to
inquire ofjurors regarding racial prejudice, not required to ask any particular number of
questions or in any particular form; trial judge's refusal to inquire of jurors regarding
prejudice against persons with beards not unconstitutional); Aldridge v. United States,
283 U.S. 308, 310 (1931)(court may conduct voir dire and has broad discretion as to
questions to be asked). See generally Gutman, The Attorney Conducted Voir Dire ofjurors: A
Constitutional Right, 39 BROOKLYN L. REv. 290 (1972); Note, Court Control of Voir Dire Exam-
ination of Prospective Jurors, 15 DE PAUL L. REV. 107 (1965); Note, Voir Dire Examination:
Court or Counsel, 11 ST. Louis U.L.J. 234 (1967).
92 See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1866(c)(1982).
93 See Rosales-Lopez v. United States, 451 U.S. 182, 188-89 (1981); Connors v.
United States, 158 U.S. 403, 413-14 (1895).
94 In addition, a judge may not want to stigmatize a juror who has claimed an ability
to judge the case fairly, in effect, or so the juror may perceive, calling the juror mistaken
or a liar.
95 See Rosales-Lopez, 451 U.S. at 189 ("[Tlhe obligation to impanel an impartial jury
lies in the first instance with the trial judge .... ). In Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412,
423 (1985), the Supreme Court reaffirmed the central role of the trial judge in impanel-
ling a jury. See also 28 U.S.C. § 1866(c) (1982).
96 In brief, it would be desirable to have (1) an initial screening by qualified social
scientists working under the auspices of the court to identify persons with the potential
to be impartial jurors; (2) "impartiality training" to develop and sharpen that impartial-
ity; and (3) analysis of those jurors called to serve in a given case to determine if they can
in fact act impartially in that case.
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of the community. The sixth amendment guarantees a jury from
"the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed,
which district shall have been previously ascertained by law."'9 7 In
the past half century, the Supreme Court has apparently either
transformed this provision into a mandate that jurors be drawn from
a fair cross-section of the community or found an independent fair
cross-section requirement implicit in the sixth amendment.98
When jurors were selected because of their knowledge of the
case, it was logical that they be from the "vicinage." 99 Persons from
the locality were more likely to know the relevant facts. The pur-
pose of a "vicinage" requirement becomes less clear when the role
of the jury is that of fact finder. Convenience to jurors may be a
minor consideration.1 00 With respect to impartiality, jurors from
the vicinage are more likely to be acquainted directly or indirectly
with the parties or witnesses and thus may be less able to maintain
neutrality until after hearing the evidence.
The concept of cross-section representation should not be
taken literally. At an illogical extreme, it would require the seating
of jurors irrationally prejudiced against the accused to the extent
such prejudice existed within the community. If the legal system
were truly concerned that the defendant be tried by a jury of
peers,10 1 that concern would likely be defeated by a cross-section
requirement.
Cross-section representation facilitates the introduction of
community values into the decision making process. In some cases
these values, rather than impartiality, are what is sought from the
97 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
98 The first seed seems to have been planted in Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128 (1940),
where the Supreme Court stated: "It is part of the established tradition in the use of
juries as instruments of public justice that the jury be a body truly representative of the
community." Id. at 130. This concept was nurtured in Glasser v. United States, 315
U.S. 60, 85-86 (1942) and Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187, 191 (1946). See also
Thiel v. Southern Pacific Co., 328 U.S. 217, 220 (1946)("American tradition of trial by
jury . .. necessarily contemplates an impartial jury drawn from a cross-section of the
community."). In Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975), the Court finally harvested
its crop: "We accept the fair-cross-section requirement as fundamental to the jury trial
guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment .... " Id. at 530.
99 See E. COKE, supra note 26, at 125. See generally Blume, The Place of TTial in Criminal
Cases: Constitutional Vicinage and Venue, 43 MICH. L. REV. 59 (1944); Connor, The Constitu-
tional Right to a Trial by a jury of the Vicinage, 57 U. PA. L. REV. 197 (1909); Kersh, Vicinage,
29 OKLA. L. REV. 801 (1976); 30 OKLA. L. REV. 1 (1977). The term "vicinage" should
not be confused with "venue." The latter refers to the place where the trial is to be
held; the former relates to the place from which the jurors are selected.
100 A federal judge may excuse ajuror for whom service would cause "extreme incon-
venience." 28 U.S.C. § 1866(c) (1982).
101 See supra notes 31-39 and accompanying text.
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jury. One example is a prosecution for pornography, in which the
legal standard is defined in terms of community values. 10 2 Less ob-
vious illustrations involve crimes where the jury must determine
whether a defendant acted dishonestly, unfairly, or unreasonably.
In these cases the jury may be required primarily to make quasi-
legal judgments rather than factual determinations. The amor-
phousness of the controlling legal standard, coupled with the reluc-
tance of the courts to decide the issues themselves, forces the jury to
apply community standards regarding dishonesty, unfairness, or un-
reasonableness. 03 While the legal system could permit the intro-
duction of evidence as to the community standard, it has opted for
the less time consuming and perhaps more accurate approach of as-
suming that a jury composed of a cross-section of the community
will reflect community values.
Cross-section representation, like nondiscrimination, may also
focus on democratic values having little to do with impartiality.
Both provide for full citizenry participation, or at least its appear-
ance, in the legal process. Both help avoid feelings of inferiority
which might be suggested by exclusion from jury panels. Both con-
tribute to the acceptance of verdicts by the litigants and the public.
The advantage of a cross-section rather than an equal protec-
tion analysis is that the former provides a more sanitized approach
to achieving the same democratic goals. The probe for proof of
purposeful discrimination, required for an equal protection chal-
lenge, is not necessary when cross-section representation is the is-
sue. 10 4 Nor does the Supreme Court have to imply, as it arguably
does in its discrimination decisions, that a jury composed of all
white males is by definition biased while minorities and women are
either impartial or biased in a way which will offset the biases of the
white males. A cross-section analysis requires only a finding that the
jury lacked the opportunity to be exposed to the full range of com-
munity viewpoints.
Cross-section analysis, however, may pose practical problems
that the equal protection approach does not. What community the
jury must be a cross-section of needs to be delineated. Is commu-
nity to be defined in geographic, ethnic, cultural, or ideological
terms? If a crime is committed in that portion of a city populated
primarily by, say, Puerto Ricans, is it the Puerto Rican connection
102 See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
103 See, e.g., Regina v. Feely, 1973 Q.B. 530 (1973)ojury should apply current stan-
dards of ordinary, decent people to determine what contributes dishonesty).
104 See Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 509-10 (1977) (Powell, J., dissenting).
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which defines the contours of community?' 05 Does it matter
whether the victim or the defendant is Puerto Rican? Or is the en-
tire city the relevant community?' 0 6 If not, what portion of it? The
larger the community, the greater the diversity of viewpoints, yet the
further removed is the legal system from the constitutional require-
ment that jurors be drawn from the district in which the crime oc-
curred. These definitional problems are less central in the
discrimination cases, in which all that must be identified is a distinct
class or group excluded from jury service.
There are further definitional difficulties. The Supreme Court
has spoken in terms of a "fair cross-section requirement."' 1 7 What
groups are part of this cross-section? Women' 08 and minorities' 0 9
seem to be included. Other groups considered by courts have in-
cluded aliens, t t0 persons with beards,"' members of a political
party, 112 youths,i 3t'and the elderly."14 In Duren v. Missouri,115 the
Supreme Court stated:
In order to establish a prima facie violation of the fair cross-section
requirement, the defendant must show (1) that the group alleged to be
excluded is a "distinctive" group in the community; (2) that the repre-
sentation of this group in venires from which juries are selected is not
fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the
community; and (3) that this underrepresentation is due to systematic
exclusion of the group in the jury selection process.1 16
105 See Alvorado v. State, 486 P.2d 891 (Alaska 1971)(stressing differences between
Native villagers and city residents in holding that trial before latter, where crime oc-
curred in village, denied defendant of his right to an impartial jury).
106 Compare Ruthenberg v. United States, 245 U.S. 480 (1918)(jury may be drawn
from part of a district) with People v.Jones, 9 Cal. 3d 546, 510 P.2d 705, 108 Cal. Rptr.
345 (1973)(while jury drawn from either entire county or portion of county wherein
crime was committed will satisfy sixth amendment, one drawn from portion of county
exclusive of place of commission of crime will not).
107 Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 535-36 (1975).
108 Id.
109 See, e.g., Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493 (1972).
110 See United States v. Gordon-Nikkar, 518 F.2d 972 (5th Cir. 1975)(no right to have
resident alien included in grand or petit jury venire).
I I See Ham v. South Carolina, 409 U.S. 524 (1973)(trial court's failure to inquire
about juror bias towards persons with beards not unconstitutional).
112 At least one court has rejected political affiliation as a basis for exclusion from jury
service. See, e.g., Simmons v.Jones, 317 F. Supp. 397, 406 (S.D. Ga. 1970), rev'd on other
grounds, 478 F.2d 321 (5th Cir. 1973).
13 See Barber v. Ponte, 772 F.2d 982 (1st Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1050 (1986);
Brown v. Harris, 666 F.2d 782 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 948 (1982); United
States v. Guzman, 337 F. Supp. 140 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 468 F.2d 1245 (2d Cir. 1972), cert.
denied, 410 U.S. 937 (1973).
114 See State v. Brewer, 247 N.W.2d 205 (Iowa 1976)(persons over 65).
115 439 U.S. 357 (1979).
116 Id. at 364. Accord, Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 172 (1986)("The essence of a
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The shift in focus to "distinctive" groups is not particularly
helpful. For example, if half a community is unemployed, would the
unemployed be a "distinctive" group? 1 7 Size might have some ef-
fect on the point at which a group will be deemed "distinctive." '" 18
If the third element of the Duren standard, systematic exclusion, is
present, however, why should it matter whether the excluded group
is "distinctive?" Moreover, the requirement of a "fair and reason-
able" representation of such groups invites statistical haggling.
The Court has not permitted the fair cross-section requirement
to serve as a basis for challenges for cause, and has stated that there
is "no requirement that petit juries actually chosen must mirror the
community and reflect the various distinctive groups in the popula-
tion."'' 19 While this surrender to reality seems inevitable, it also
fair cross section' claim is the systematic exclusion of a distinctive' group in the
community.").
117 The most likely answer is "no." See Anaya v. Hansen, 781 F.2d 1 (1st Cir.
1986)(blue collar workers not distinctive group). In McCree, the Supreme Court stated:
We have never attempted to precisely define the term 'distinctive group' and we do
not undertake to do so today. But we think it obvious that the concept of 'distinc-
tiveness' must be linked to the purposes of the fair cross-section requirement. In
Taylor we identified those purposes as (1) 'guard[ing] against the exercise of arbi-
trary power' and ensuring that the 'commonsense judgment of the community' will
act as 'a hedge against the overzealous or mistaken prosecutor,' (2) preserving 'pub-
lic confidence in the fairness of the criminal justice system', and (3) implementing
our belief that 'sharing in the administration ofjustice is a phase of civic responsibil-
ity.'
Our prior jury representativeness cases, whether based on the fair cross-section
component of the Sixth Amendment or the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment, have involved such groups as blacks, women, and Mexican-
Americans. The wholesale exclusion of these large groups from jury service clearly
contravened all three of the aforementioned purposes of the fair cross-section re-
quirement. Because these groups were excluded for reasons completely unrelated
to the ability of members of the group to serve as jurors in a particular case, the
exclusion raised at least the possibility that the composition ofjuries would be arbi-
trarily skewed in such a way as to deny criminal defendants the benefit of the com-
mon sensejudgment of the community. In addition, the exclusion from jury service
of large groups of individuals not on the basis of their inability to serve as jurors,
but on the basis of some immutable characteristic such as race, gender, or ethnic
background, undeniably gave rise to an 'appearance of unfairness.' Finally, such
exclusion improperly deprived members of these often historically disadvantaged
groups of their right as citizens to serve on juries in criminal cases.
476 U.S. at 174-75 (citations omitted).
Being unemployed would not be an immutable characteristic and would not seem to
fall within the Court's guidelines. But see Thiel v. Southern Pacific Co., 328 U.S. 217,
220 (1946)(daily wage earners constitute cognizable class). See generally Comment, Un-
derrepresentation of Economic Groups on FederalJuries, 57 B.U.L. REv. 198 (1977). In McCree,
the Court found that "Witherspoon-excludables" were likewise not a distinct group for
fair cross-section purposes. 476 U.S. at 175.
118 Consider, for example, the homosexual population in a small rural community.
Statistically, it may not be large. If, however, all suspected homosexuals are excluded
from jury service, there may be a constitutional violation.
119 Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 538 (1975), quoted in McCree, 476 U.S. at 172-73;
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 85-86 n.6 (1986).
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means that many juries will not in fact contain that diversity of view-
points at which the fair cross-section requirement is aimed. 120
Although the fair cross-section requirement on its face may im-
ply geographical diversity, it is really a diversity of viewpoints which
the legal system seeks.' 21 The theory is that these differing perspec-
tives will play off each other in the jury room, allowing for a full
exploration of the legal and factual issues of the case. Geographical
diversity, however, does not necessarily ensure a diversity of per-
spectives. In every subpart of a community can be found persons
whose views, for example, span the political spectrum. To pluck
from each of those subparts those members who are politically con-
servative would achieve geographical but not political diversity.
Likewise, cultural, ethnic, sexual, and religious diversity do not, in
and of themselves, ensure a diversity of viewpoints. That racial, sex-
ual, and ethnic diversity, rather than a diversity of viewpoints, domi-
nates the Court's thinking is indicated by its failure to ask whether
the "black" or "female" perspective can be adequately represented
by other members of the community. In the death penalty context
the Court has rejected the idea that groups defined in terms of
shared attitudes are "distinctive" for fair cross-section purposes. In
Lockhart v. McCree,122 the Court upheld the challenge for cause of
prospective jurors whose philosophical and moral opposition to
capital punishment would prevent or substantially impair their abil-
ity to carry out their sentencing responsibilities. 23
In the final analysis, there does not appear to be any inherent
correlation between cross-section representation and impartiality,
despite the Supreme Court's assertion in McCree that "the Constitu-
tion presupposes that a jury selected from a fair cross-section of the
community is impartial... so long as the jurors can conscientiously
and properly carry out their sworn duty to apply the law to the facts
of the particular case."'124 The reference to the fair cross-section
requirement is arguably superfluous. Twelve randomly selected in-
dividuals from the community may all be prejudiced in one way or
another; twelve professors of logic with common demographic char-
120 See Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223 (1978)(refusing in part for this reason to allow
juries of less than six).
121 See Thiel, 328 U.S. at 232 (Frankfuter, J., dissenting) ("The object is to devise a
jury] system that is fairly representative of our variegated population, exacts the obliga-
tion of citizenship to share in the administration ofjustice without operating too harshly
upon any section of the community, and is duly regardful of the public interest in mat-
ters outside the jury system.").
122 476 U.S. 162 (1986).
123 Id. at 175-76.
124 Id. at 183.
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acteristics, all of whom live on the same block, may be impartial. At
best, cross-section representation serves the goal of impartiality not
by eliminating bias but by creating a diversity of biases on the jury,
thereby increasing the likelihood of obtaining a range of community
views. These diverse perspectives should, in theory, promote dis-
cussion of all aspects of a case within the jury and are particularly
relevant when the legal system consciously desires to ascertain how
the community feels about an issue.
As thus conceived, cross-section representation is a means to
the end of achieving a heterogeneous jury. But, as indicated, it is a
rather crude and unreliable tool. Suppose, for instance, a murder is
committed in a ghetto neighborhood whose inhabitants believe in
settling disputes by force. The victim is an outsider. A cross-section
of the community may yield a jury whose members accept violence
as a legitimate means of dispute resolution. A verdict of guilty re-
turned by such ajury is more likely to be accepted by the defendant
and the community. The more probable acquittal, however, may
not be accepted by the victim's family or society in general merely
because a cross-section of the community returned it.
If diversity of viewpoints is the goal, the Court should mandate
proportional, or at least some, representation on the jury of all ma-
jor distinct groups in the community. 125 The Court, however, ap-
pears satisfied if juries on the whole are statistically representative
bodies. Such statistics are of little solace to a defendant whose jury
is not representative. The problem is that, even conceding the sim-
plistic, stereotypic, and most likely incorrect assumption that any
member of a group will reflect the views of that group, there are so
many such groups that requiring that all be represented on ajury of
twelve would be impossible.
It is for this reason that both the cross-section requirement and
the nondiscrimination principle, regardless of theoretical merit, are
doomed in practice. It is simply not feasible to include all racial,
ethnic, religious, cultural, and other distinct groups or segments of
a heterogeneous community on a panel of twelve.' 26 When one
adds to the calculus statutorily prescribed occupational exemptions
from jury service, 1 27 judicial sympathies to jurors who ask to be ex-
125 See People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 258, 277, 583 P.2d 748, 762, 148 Cal. Rptr. 890,
903 (1978), noted in Comment, People v. Wheeler: Peremptory Challenges-A New Interpreta-
tion, 14 NEW. ENG. L. REv. 370, 386 (1978)). See also Note, Limiting the Peremptory Chal-
lenge: Representation of Groups on Petit Juries, 86 YALE LJ. 1715 (1977).
126 See McCree, 476 U.S. at 174-75; Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 86-87 (1986);
Thiel v. Southern Pacific Co., 328 U.S. 217, 220 (1946); Akins v. Texas, 325 U.S. 398,
403 (1945).
127 For a compilation of such exemptions, seeJ. VAN DYKE, supra note 31, at app. C.
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cused due to financial hardship, 28 and, most significantly, peremp-
tory challenges, 29 the likelihood of cross-section representation in
practice is further decreased.
A number of Supreme Court decisions which run counter to the
ideal sought in the cross-section and nondiscrimination cases sug-
gests that the Court is more enamored with theory than reality. For
example, the Court has upheld the use of juries of six in criminal
cases.130 The constitutional correctness of this position aside, obvi-
ous even to a non-mathematician is that the likelihood of a repre-
sentative cross-section of the community and inclusion of minority
groups will be statistically diminished if the size of the jury is cut in
half.'3 1 Furthermore, if the jury does contain a biased member,
there will be fewer other jurors to offer rebuttal.
Exemptions generally are justified on one of three theories: first, that the exempted
class is too valuable to society to spare for jury service, such as doctors; second, that the
exempted class is too likely to unduly influence other jurors, such as lawyers; or third,
that the exempted class is too prone to be prejudiced as a result of their jobs, such as
police officers. Id. at 130-31.
128 Id. at 119-21. See also 28 U.S.C. § 1866(c) (1982)(judge may excuse juror upon a
showing of undue hardship or extreme inconvenience); Thiel, 328 U.S. at 224. The elim-
ination of the poor, according to one author, "results in juries which tend to bring in
more convictions and to sympathize less with the underdog.'" Kuhn, supra note 7, at
303. It also can lead to the exclusion of minorities. See Labat v. Bennett, 365 F.2d 698,
724 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 991 (1967). On the other hand, one might
question whether a person who does not want to serve, as indicated by the request to be
excused, will be a conscientious juror. Will the juror who perceives that jury service is
causing economic disadvantage be willing to engage in the extended deliberation re-
quired in a complex case?
129 SeeJ. VAN DYKE, supra note 31, at ch. 6. A peremptory challenge can be made for
any reason which an attorney sees fit and need not, unlike challenges for cause, bejusti-
fied to the court. As such, it can be used to eliminate relatively small classes of the
population. In one instance, however, where a prosecutor uses peremptory challenges
to eliminate all blacks from a jury trying a black defendant, the Supreme Court has
found a violation of equal protection. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). The
Court, however, declined to adopt Justice Marshall's suggestion that because of their
potential for discrimination, peremptory challenges should be eliminated altogether,
both for the prosecution and the defense. Id. at 102-03 (Marshall, J., concurring). See
generally Note, Survey of the Law of Peremptory Challenges: Uncertainty in the Criminal Law, 44
U. Prrr. L. REv. 673 (1983).
130 Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970).
131 The majority in Williams, however, disagreed. Referring in part to the cross-sec-
tion requirement, the Court stated: "[W]e find little reason to think that these goals are
in any meaningful sense less likely to be achieved when the jury numbers six, than when'
it numbers [twelve] .... Id. at 100.
In Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223 (1978), the Court conceded that the community
would be less represented by further reduction of the jury to five. Id. at 236-37. In
Ballew, unlike in Williams, the Court supported its position with a wealth of social science
studies. See Ballew, 435 U.S. at 231 n. 10. Virtually all of the studies cited by the Court
were prompted by the Court's decision in Williams and were designed to show the nega-
tive effects which resulted when the size of the jury was reduced from 12 to 6.
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The Supreme Court has also permitted non-unanimous jury
verdicts. 132 This decision, too, arguably defeats the purposes be-
hind cross-section representation and nondiscrimination.1 33 Part of
the rationale for diversity is to expose majority members of the jury
to the views of minority members of the community. However, if
the majority need not convince the minority that their position is
unsound in order to prevail, the value of diversity may be de-
feated. 134 While the majority may choose not to ignore or override
the minority,' 35 the potential does not exist if unanimous verdicts
are required.
Although it is unlikely that juries will actually be composed of a
cross-section of the community, the theoretical possibility may have
to be preserved. Appearances may be as important as reality. An
avowed or tacit policy permitting discrimination in juror selection or
exclusion of an identifiable segment of the community could under-
mine popular support for the legal system and the law itself. The
pertinent point regarding impartiality, however, is that neither non-
discrimination nor cross-section representation can be relied upon
to provide an impartial jury as a matter of either theory or practice.
C. JURY NULLIFICATION AND IMPARTIALITY
There is another situation where the legal system is as much
concerned with community values as it is with impartiality. The allo-
cation in England to juries rather than judges of the authority to
render verdicts was, as discussed previously, in large part attributa-
ble to the jury's function as fact knowers rather than fact finders. 136
Yet the emergence of the jury system may also have reflected a de-
sire for community involvement in the legal system. Judges, well
educated and generally from the middle or upper classes, often
lacked knowledge of or had lost contact with the values of the com-
132 See Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972); Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356
(1972). If the jury is less than twelve, however, unanimity may be necessary. See Burch
v. Louisiana, 441 U.S. 130 (1979).
133 See Note, Johnson v. Louisiana and Apodaca v. Oregon: Unanimity in the Criminal Jury
Verdict, 7 GA. L. REV. 339 (1973); Note, In the Wake of Apodaca v. Oregon: A Case for Retain-
ing Unanimous Jury Verdicts, 7 VAL. U.L. REV. 249 (1973); Note, A Constitutional Renvoi:
Unanimous Verdicts in State Criminal Trials, 41 FORDHAM L. REV. 115 (1972).
134 From an historical perspective, Forsyth points out that one of the major advan-
tages of the unanimity requirement was that it forced those in the majority to listen to
and respond to the arguments of the minority. W. FoRsyrH, supra note 13, at 246.
135 This was the view of the majority in Johnson and Apodaca. See Johnson, 406 U.S. at
361. Kalven and Zeisel, however, found that juries tend to stop deliberating when the
requisite majority is achieved. H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, supra note 18, at 201.
136 See supra notes 21-25 and accompanying text.
298 [Vol. 79
1988] IN SEARCH OF THE IMPARTIAL JURY 299
mon man.13 7 The jury vicariously ensured that common, or com-
munity, values would not be ignored in the decision making
process. 13 8
If juries reflected community values, an impartial jury required
an impartial community, as a jury which reflected community values
would also reflect community prejudices. If the community was not
impartial, it would seem that the legal system had to choose between
an impartial jury which did not reflect community values and one
which was not impartial but did reflect community values. In point
of fact, a somewhat schizophrenic compromise was struck. If com-
munity prejudices ran sufficiently high against a defendant, a change
in venue could be obtained, thereby moving the site of the trial from
a clearly partial community to one that was more neutral.139 On the
other hand, a jury could acquit a defendant even though a strict and
137 Sir William Holdsworth provided a perceptive analysis of the value of the jury in
this regard:
[The jury system] tends to make the law intelligible by keeping it in touch with the
common facts of life. The reasons why and the manner in which it thus affects the
law are somewhat as follows: If a clever man is left to decide by himself disputed
questions of fact he is usually not content simply to decide each case as it arises. He*
constructs theories for the decision of analogous cases. These theories are dis-
cussed, doubted, or developed by other clever men when such cases come before
them. The interest is apt to centre, not in the dry task of deciding the case before
the court but rather in the construction of new theories, the reconciliation of con-
flicting cases, the demolition of criticism of older views. The result is a series of
carefully constructed, and periodically considered rules, which merely retard the
attainment of a conclusion without assisting in its formation. It is only the philoso-
pher, or possibly the professor of general jurisprudence, who can pursue indefi-
nitely these interesting processes. Rules of law must struggle for existence in the
strong air of practical life. Rules which are so refined that they bear but a small
relation to the world of sense will sooner or later be swept away. Sooner, if, like the
criminal law or the commercial law, they touch nearly men's habits and conduct;
later, if, like the law of real property, they affect a smaller class, and affect them less
nearly. The jury system has for some hundreds of years been constantly bringing
the rules of law to the touchstone of contemporary common sense.
1 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 349 (3d ed. 1922).
138 See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968)("If the defendant preferred the
common sense judgment of a jury to the more tutored but perhaps less sympathetic
reaction of the single judge, he was to have it."). As a result, jurors may be more prone
to reach an equitable result while judges are more likely to reach a legally correct one.
See P. DEVLIN, supra note 3, at 151-58.
139 See, e.g., Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723 (1963). In Groppi v. Wisconsin, 400
U.S. 505 (1971), the Supreme Court struck down a statute which prevented a change of
venue in misdemeanor cases, regardless of the extent of prejudice against the defend-
ant. The Court held that the accused's right to an impartial jury had been violated. Id.
at 510. See generally Orfield, Venue of Federal Criminal Cases, 17 U. Prrr. L. REV. 375 (1956).
It has been suggested, however, that in controversial cases, particularly where the de-
fendant is accused of murder, judges may succumb to community pressure to deny a
change in venue in order that the community may exact retribution. See Mullin, The Juiy
System in Death Penalty Cases: A Symbolic Gesture, 43 LAw & CONTEMrP. PROBS. 137, 142
(1980).
Other possible remedies to combat community hostility may include granting a con-
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technical application of controlling legal principles would require a
conviction.
This phenomenon, known as jury nullification, has a long, and
controversial, history in Anglo-American jurisprudence. 140 An il-
logical verdict in favor of a defendant in a criminal case is subject to
neither review nor reversal, despite the fact that an equally irrational
verdict in favor of the prosecution would be reversed.1 4 ' The ap-
tinuance or bringing in a foreign jury. See generally Note, Community Hostility and the Right
to an ImpartialJury, 60 COLUM. L. REV. 349 (1960).
140 Compare Simson,Jury Nullification in the American System: A Skeptical View, 54 TEX. L.
REV. 488 (1976)(strong critique ofjury nullification), with Scheflin,Jury Nullification: The
Right to Say No, 45 S. CAL. L. REV. 168 (1972)(favorable view of jury nullification). To
some extent, the controversy stems from differing perceptions of what the jury does
when it engages in nullification. Critics tend to see an abrogation of a legislatively en-
acted statute. Proponents tend to explain nullification as an instance of legislative inter-
pretation: the jury is construing the statute in the manner which the legislature would
have desired had it anticipated the factual situation. Both views of nullification may be
correct: in some instances, such as when ajury refuses to convict for violation of prohi-
bition laws, it is engaged in the former; when ajury acquits in a case of mercy killing, it is
engaged in the latter. See generally Kadish & Kadish, On justified Rule Departures by Officials,
59 CALIF. L. REV. 905, 911-30 (197 1); Pound, Law in Books and Law in Action, 44 Am. JUR.
REV. 12, 18 (1910); Scheftin and Van Dyke,Jury Nullification: The Contours of a Controversy,
43 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBs. 51 (1980); Note, Jury Nullification: The Forgotten Right, 7
N.E.L. REV. 105 (1971).
The power to nullify is most often traced to Bushell's Case, 124 Eng. Rep. 1006
(C.P. 1670). For the defendants' description of their case, see W. FORSYTH, supra note
13, at 396-404. In Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246 (1952), the Supreme Court
implicitly recognized the power ofjuries to engage in nullification:
Had the jury convicted on proper instructions it would be the end of the matter.
But juries are not bound by what seems inescapable logic to judges .... They might
have refused to brand Morissette as a thief. Had they done so, that too would have
been the end of the matter.
Id. at 276.
The most famous historical example of jury nullification in the United States in-
volved the acquittal of the American colonist John Peter Zenger for criminal sedition.
See J. ALEXANDER, A BRIEF NARRATION OF THE CASE AND TRIAL OF JOHN PETER ZENGER
(1963). The issue has more recently been raised in trials of political protesters. See
Kunstler,Jury Nullification in Conscience Cases, 10 VA.J. INT'L. L. 71 (1969); Sax, Rex v. Dean
of St. Joseph's, Conscience and Anarchy: The Prosecution of War Resisters, 57 YALE REv. 481
(1968).
It is sometimes debated whether jury nullification is a right or a power. Most regard
it as the latter. As early as 1784, Justice Willes maintained: "[t]hejury... have a consti-
tutional right, if they think fit, to examine the innocence or criminality of the paper,
notwithstanding there is sufficient proof of the publication . . . I believe no man will
venture to say they have not the power, but I mean expressly to say they have the right."
King v. Shipley, 99 Eng. Rep. 774, 824-25 (K.B. 1784). Justice Aghurst, on the other
hand, stated: "I admit the jury have the power of finding a verdict against the law, and so
they have of finding a verdict against the evidence but I deny they have the right to do
so." Id. at 828 (emphasis added). See also W. FORSYTH, supra note 13, at 261. The se-
mantic distinction of whether jury nullification is a power or a right arguably has little
practical effect.
141 See McCleskey v. Kemp, 107 S. Ct. 1756, 1777 (1987). Some courts have charac-
terized nullificaton in terms of lenity. See, e.g., Steckler v. United States, 7 F.2d 59, 60
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parent rationale for this dichotomy is that community values should
be allowed to temper the rigor of the law.142 A jury is permitted to
be partial to but not partial against an accused. 143 In this respect,
jury nullification is consistent with the language of the sixth amend-
ment giving the accused, but not the government, the right to an
impartial jur-y.1 4 4 Nullification is an institutional recognition that, in
some instances, partiality may be permissible.
Jury nullification serves other socially useful functions. It indi-
cates to the appropriate authorities that the law no longer accords
with community values. 145 When, for example, juries declined to
convict for violation of prohibition laws, they expressed popular dis-
approval of prohibition as surely as if they had voted in a referen-
dum. 146 Similarly, the community may disapprove of particular
(2d Cir. 1925) quoted in Dunn v. United States, 284 U.S. 390, 393 (1932). See generally
United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113, 1130-37 (D.C. Cir. 1972)(reviewing history
of and justifications for nullification).
142 See W. FORSYrH, supra note 13, at 430-32. Wigmore points out that the jury system
preserves the appearance that the law applies equally to all while permitting individuali-
iation in cases in which strict application of legal principles would yield an unjust result.
The legal system, thus, may have an active interest in having juries exercise their nullifi-
cation prerogative. It spares judges, theoretically committed to the letter of the law and
its equal application to all, from having to bend legal principles to reach equitable re-
sults. Jury nullification permits the system to preserve an outward appearance of objec-
tivity while introducing appropriate flexibility. Wigmore, A Program for the Trial of a Jury,
12J. AM. JUD. SOC. 166 (1929). See also P. DEVLIN, supra note 3, at 151-58; Note, Commu-
nity Hostility and the Right to an Impartial Jury, 60 COLUM. L. REV. 349, 350 (1960).
143 While it has been argued that as a matter of strict logic, the power to nullify should
cut both ways, see Simson, supra note 140, at 516, there is much to be said for permitting
the exercise of mercy, a generally approved value, but not that of vindictiveness, a gen-
erally disapproved value. See W. FORSyTH, supra note 13, at 430-31. Moreover, while
neither society nor the criminal law would be outraged if the jury acquitted a technically
guilty defendant because he was a "good" person, fundamental principles of legality
would be compromised if the jury could convict a technically innocent defendant be-
cause he was perceived to be a "bad" person.
144 U.S. CONST. amend. VI. But see supra notes 76-86 and accompanying text, which
discuss society's interest in an impartial jury. The Supreme Court in other contexts has
recognized that constitutional rights accorded to a defendant may be for the benefit of
the government as well. See, e.g., Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1974) (right to speedy
trial). For the reasons discussed previously, the right to an impartial jury may also fall
into this category. If so, jury nullification might conflict with the government's interest
in an impartialjury. However, because jurors need not disclose the basis of their verdict
and lawyers are generally barred from pressing jurors to discover that basis, any viola-
tion would be virtually impossible to establish. Moreover, even if such a violation could
be proved, principles of double jeopardy would safeguard the defendant against further
prosecution.
145 See P. DEVLIN, supra note 3, at 160-62; W. FORSyrH, supra note 13, at 429; H.
KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, supra note 18, at chs. 16-19.
146 Ironically,jury nullification may retard legislative reform by convincing the legisla-
ture that there is no need to act. As jurors opposed to the law will engage in nullifica-
tion, the legislature need not alienate the law's supporters by repealing it. See H. KALVEN
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penalties. In nineteenth century England, countless crimes carried
an automatic death penalty. Jury acquittals often reflected not the
defendant's innocence but the jury's belief that the penalty was dis-
proportionate to the offense. 147
The Supreme Court appears to have overlooked, or at least
downplayed, the role of jury nullification in its death penalty deci-
sions. In Witherspoon v. Illinois,14s the Court condemned the auto-
matic exclusion from jury service of persons with conscientious
objections to capital punishment. It did permit, however, the chal-
lenge of those who, regardless of the evidence, would automatically
vote against the imposition of capital punishment. Justice Stewart
noted that "a jury composed exclusively of [those favoring the death
penalty] cannot speak for the community."' 149 In a subsequent deci-
sion, however, the Court extended the challenge for cause to those
jurors who indicated that their ability to judge a case would be pre-
vented or substantially impaired because of their views about capital
punishment. 150 Relating this theme to the concept of the impartial
jury, the Court in Wainwright v. Witt 151 stated:
[T]he quest is for jurors who will conscientiously apply the law and
find the facts. That is what an "impartial" jury consists of and we do
not think, simply because a defendant is being tried for a capital crime,
that he is entitled to a legal presumption or standard that allows jurors
& H. ZEISEL, supra note 18, at 291; Kadish & Kadish, supra note 140, at 920-2 1; Simson,
supra note 140, at 514-15.
147 See W. CORNISH, supra note 3, at 128-33. W. FORSYTH, supra note 13, at 430; H.
KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, supra note 18, at 310-11. Kalven and Zeisel provide several mod-
ern day examples where juries acquit because the penalty is perceived as too severe. Id.
at 306-10. Severe sanctions for criminal activity, while in theory maximizing the deter-
rent effect of a law, often prove counterproductive in practice. Potential criminals are
not deterred as they know juries will be reluctant to convict in light of the oppressive
penalties attached to the offense.
Other instances where juries may chose to engage in nullification occur when they
believe the victim has unduly contributed to the crime, the defendant has already suf-
fered sufficiently, or the police have abused their authority.
148 391 U.S. 510 (1968).
149 Id. at 520. The Court has subsequently indicated the importance of the impartial
jury guaranty in this context by holding that Witherspoon violations are not subject to
harmless error analysis. Gray v. Mississippi, 107 S. Ct. 2045 (1987).
150 See, e.g., Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412 (1985). See also Darden v. Wainwright,
477 U.S. 168, 176 (1986). Moreover, in a bifurcated trial,jurors whose expressed oppo-
sition to the death penalty is so strong that it would substantially impair their ability to
function at the sentencing phase may be excused for cause. Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S.
162 (1986). The Witt standard in theory applies also to those jurors whose ability to
judge the case objectively would be hindered by their views in favor of capital punish-
ment. It is far less likely, however, that there will be many jurors who will admit to
falling in this category.
151 469 U.S. 412 (1985).
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to be seated who quite likely will be biased in his favor.15 2
The presumption of innocence does, of course, entitle the de-
fendant to a jury which is -biased in his favor at the outset. The
Court was concerned with the effect of lingering bias during deliber-
ation. In allowing jurors with reservations about capital punishment
to be excused, however, the Court may have sanctioned juries with a
bias towards conviction.153 In any event, the Court's position seems
in tension, if not outright conflict, with the concept ofjury nullifica-
tion. Furthermore, although the Court has rejected the argument,
its position frustrates cross-section representation to the extent that
a portion of the community is opposed to the death penalty.' 54
With respect to impartiality, the Court's statement in Witt stands in
marked contrast to its subsequent callous pronouncement in Lock-
hart v. McCree 155 that even if a jury, from which "Witherspoon-ex-
cludables" had been removed for cause, was more prone to convict,
such a jury did not offend the constitutional guarantee of impartial-
ity. 15 6 The Supreme Court has also held that where ajury has rec-
ommended a life sentence in a capital case, arguably thereby
expressing community sentiment, a judge may override that deci-
152 Id. at 423-24.
153 This was the conclusion of the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in Grigsby v. Ma-
bry, 758 F.2d 226, 229 (8th Cir. 1985). Among the studies cited in support of this con-
clusion were Cowan, Thompson, & Ellsworth, The Effects of Death Qualification on Jurors'
Predisposition to Convict and on the Quality of Deliberation, 8 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 53 (1984);
Goldberg, Toward Expansion of Witherspoon; Capital Scruples, Jury Bias, and Use of Psychological
Data to Raise Presumptions in the Law, 5 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 53 (1970); Jurow, New
Data on the Effect of a "Death Qualified"Jury on the Guilt Determination Process, 84 HARV. L.
REV. 567 (1971); H. Zeisel, Some Data on Juror Attitudes toward Capital Punishment
(University of Chicago Monograph 1968); W. Wilson, Belief in Capital Punishment and
Jury Performance (unpublished manuscript, University of Texas, 1964). The Eighth Cir-
cuit's decision was reversed in Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162 (1986). The Supreme
Court expressed considerable skepticism about the validity and reliability of the studies
on which the appellate court had relied. Id. at 168. The Court proceeded, however, on
the assumption that the studies were valid. Id. at 173. The California Supreme Court
was considerably more impressed by many of these same studies. See Hovey v. Superior
Court, 28 Cal. 3d 1, 616 P.2d 1301, 168 Cal. Rptr. 128 (1980).
154 See McCree, 476 U.S. at 173-75. The Court reasoned that the fair cross-section
requirement was satisfied if the composition of the venire reflected the community, re-
gardless of whether the composition of the jury did. See also Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391
U.S. 510, 520 ("Culled of all who harbor doubts about the wisdom of capital punish-
ment-of all who[m] would be reluctant to pronounce the extreme penalty-such ajury
can speak only for a distinct and dwindling minority."). See generally Winick, Prosecutorial
Peremptory Challenges in Capital Cases: An Empirical Study and a Constitutional Analysis, 81
MICH. L. REV. 1, 62-77 (1982). Interestingly, death qualification may adversely affect
blacks and females, groups to whom the Court has traditionally been solicitous, more
than others. See NATIONAL JURY PROJECT, JURYWORK 3-44 (2d ed. 1987).
155 476 U.S. 162 (1986).
156 Id. at 173.
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sion and impose the death penalty. 157
Ajury is never permitted to decide that a: law is illegal or uncon-
stitutional. 158 Nullification, however, allows the jury to express the
community's views on the law under which prosecution is brought.
In specific cases, nullification allows the jury to express its view of
the moral blameworthiness of the defendant. Nullification is thus a
limitation on, or at least a refinement of, the concept of an impartial
jury.
In cases in which the jury is asked to decide quasi-legal ques-
tions regarding values, community input is actively sought. 159 With
regard to jury nullification, however, the legal system is more ambiv-
alent about the worth of community values. Judges may direct a ver-
dict in favor of, but not against, an accused. This one sided power is
a clear acknowledgement of the jury's inalienable power to acquit,
regardless of the strength of the state's case. The legal system rec-
ognizes the jury's power to apply its own values rather than those
dictated to it by the court or inherent in the law. The failure to
require juries to give reasons for their verdicts reinforces this lati-
tude. On the other hand, the idea that jurors in an individual case
can in effect undo the work of the popularly elected legislature
causes discomfort. Nullification constitutes a threat to the funda-
mental tenet that the law applies equally to all. Indeed, to some it
suggests that there is no such entity as the law except to the extent
that a jury is willing to recognize it.160
The fact that judges rarely, if ever, inform jurors of their power
157 Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447 (1984).
158 See Sparf& Hansen v. United States, 156 U.S. 51 (1895). See generally HoweJuries
as Judges of Criminal Law, 52 HARV. L. REV. 582 (1959); Scheflin & Van Dyke, supra note
140. This, however, was not always so; at an early period in U.S. history, when princi-
ples of democracy were perhaps taken more literally and judges were not trained spe-
cialists, juries determined the law as well as the facts. See Howe, supra at 590-96.
Sometimes this right was given by state statute or constitution. See id. at 596-613. At
least two states, Maryland and Indiana, appear even today to recognize the jury's right to
decide both issues of law and fact. See V. HANS & N. VIDMAR, supra note 24, at 157. In
addition, there are arguably still some questions of law which jurors have to decide be-
cause the courts have defined a legal concept in terms of its factual components. Issues
such as reasonableness and obscenity may fall into this category.
It is sometimes argued that the potential ofjury nullification will deter a legislature
from enacting harsh or oppressive laws. See, P. DEVLIN, supra note 3, at 160-62. Not only
does this claim not seem to be borne out by empirical evidence, but the argument can be
turned on its head: knowing that juries will not convict defendants charged with violat-
ing oppressive laws, lawmakers need not overly worry about the consequences of their
acts, and may pursue ulterior objectives in passing questionable laws.
159 See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
160 See the ABA's response to Professor Van Dyke's views on jury nullification, re-
printed inJ. VAN DYKE, supra note 31, at 246-47.
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of nullification may attest to this ambivalence of the legal system.'6 '
Some jurors may be aware of this prerogative, 162 but no doubt many
more believe that their responsibility is to apply the letter of the law.
As a consequence, while the legal system tacitly recognizes that nul-
lification in some situations is acceptable, it believes that informing
jurors that they may so act is not. The seemingly inevitable result is
that jury nullification will be exercised haphazardly, depending in
part on jurors' personal knowledge of its availability. Worse still, as
jurors receive no instructions from trial judges as to when nullifica-
tion is appropriate, they may act out of caprice or prejudice rather
than principle.
In order to exercise their nullification power in a rational man-
ner, jurors may have to consider evidence that is not technically rel-
evant to guilt or innocence, and evaluate that evidence in light of
generalized principles of justice and fairness regarding which they
receive no judicial instruction. Nor can the principles simplistically
be equated with community values. Community values may be the
irrational product of majoritarian prejudices and bigotry; principles
of justice and fairness relate to basic and widely recognized ideals
and values, such as equality, dignity, liberty, and compassion. 63
Cross-section representation may provide the input of majoritarian
community values, but it may not be either the best or even a rea-
sonable means for achieving principled exercises of nullification.
Trial judges also receive little guidance about nullification from
161 Ajudge is under no legal duty to inform ajury of its nullification power. See Sparf
& Hansen v. United States, 156 U.S. 51 (1895); United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d
1113, 1130-37 (D.C. Cir. !972); United States v. Simpson, 460 F.2d 515 (9th Cir. 1972);
United States v. Moylan, 417 F.2d 1002 (4th Cir. 1969).
Other reasons for refusing to give a nullification instruction may include the follow-
ing: 1) it will encourage anarchy on the part of the jurors; 2) it is unnecessary and will
discourage other more approriate legal and political institutions from addressing troub-
lesome problems; 3) it will frustrate legislative intent; and 4) it will result in the exercise
of the nullification prerogative in cases where there is liot a "damn good reason" for
nullification. The "damn good reason" rationale is advanced by Kadish and Kadish.
The authors posit that ifjurors are not informed of their power to nullify, they will not
exercise it unless they believe there is a "damn good reason" for doing so. The danger,
of course, is that they will be reluctant to do so even when there is a "damn good rea-
son" out of fear that they are doing something inappropriate. See Kadish & Kadish, supra
note 140, at 927. See also Christie, Lawful Departure from Legal Rules: 'Jury Nullification"
and Legitimated Disobedience, 62 CALIF. L. REV. 1289 (1974); Simson, supra note 140. These
arguments are responded to by Professors'Scheflin and Van Dyke. By not providing a
nullification instruction, the judge provides jurors with an ability to rationalize a legally
correct but unpopular verdict: "We were merely following the instructions of the
judge." See United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113, 1136 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Scheflin
& Van Dyke, supra note 140, at 85-111.
162 Dougherty, 473 F.2d at 1135.
163 See generally R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY ch. 4 (1977).
1988] 305
JAMIESJ. GOBERT
appellate courts. Even assuming that the parties could discover its
occurrence,1 64 a defendant could not appeal a jury choice not to
nullify, while nullification would result in an unappealable acquittal.
That such an irrational approach to jury nullification is tolerated
may again evidence the law's desire to maintain the appearance of
an impartial jury system, whether or not juries are impartial in fact.
D. KNOWLEDGE AND IMPARTIALITY
Jurors are expected to have some basic understanding of the
function and purposes of the trial within the American legal system
and the roles of the various participants, as well as a minimal degree
of intelligence and literacy.' 65 They should be able to comprehend
judicial instructions and understand and evaluate the arguments of
counsel. They are further expected to be able to draw appropriate
inferences from facts established by the evidence. Many of these
skills require some minimal education. In pursuing this education,
the prospective juror acquires considerable knowledge unrelated to
the courtroom proceeding. A completely unknowledgeable juror is
an unlikely, if not non-existent, entity.
A judge who refers to a juror's knowledge is concerned with a
particular kind of knowledge: that relating to the current case. The
judge is concerned whether the juror is familiar with the parties, the
witnesses, the attorneys, or the facts of the case. Whether this
knowledge comes from personal acquaintance or the news media is
incidental.
It may seem strange that a legal system which originally se-
lected jurors because of their first hand knowledge of the facts 166
should now prefer jurors who know nothing about the case. The
metamorphosis no doubt involved several stages. Even after it was
determined that the jury should not consist of witnesses to the par-
ticular crime being tried, the common law requirement that jurors
164 Whetherjurors have in fact engaged in nullification is difficult to know, because of
the factual controversies present in most cases and the fact that the jury's general verdict
does not reveal which factual version it accepted. Thus, it cannot be determined
whether the jury has correctly applied legal principles to fact version A or engaged in
nullification in regard to fact version B. Judges will virtually never look beyond the
verdict to ascertain its basis. See supra note 4.
165 See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1865(b)(2)-(4) (1982). In Carter v. Jury Comm'n of Greene
County, 396 U.S. 320 (1970), the Court declared permissible the restriction ofjury ser-
vice to persons of "good intelligence, sound judgment, and fair character." Id. at 332.
Amazingly, there have been trials conducted in English where some jurors did not un-
derstand the English language. See, e.g., R. v. Thomas, 24 Crim. App. 91 (1933) discussed
in P. DEVLIN, supra note 3, at 35.
166 See supra notes 22-25 and accompanying text.
306 [Vol. 79
IN SEARCH OF THE IMPARTIAL JURY
come from the vicinage' 67 and the constitutional requirement that
jurors be drawn from the district in which the crime occurred1 68 in-
creased the likelihood that jurors would be familiar with the parties
and witnesses, if not the facts of the case. One advantage to such
jurors was that they were better able to assess the credibility of their
witness neighbors. On the other hand, there existed the danger that
familiarity might induce partiality. Recognition of this possibility
led in England to a broadening of the geographical area defining the
vicinage, 169 and provided a basis for challenging a juror for
cause.' 70 Left open was the question of whether in their delibera-
tions jurors could supplement the evidence presented in court with
their personal knowledge about the case. 171 This practice is troub-
lesome, for such ajuror is, in effect, providing to the other members
of the jury unsworn, often hearsay, testimony which has not been
subjected to cross-examination. Nonetheless, as late as the nine-
teenth century, jurors in some jurisdictions were permitted to base a
verdict on their personal knowledge. 172
Judicial rulings defining when knowledge compromises imparti-
ality to the point justifying juror disqualification have lacked uni-
formity. 173 At one extreme is the position that any knowledge
warrants excusing the juror. Under this view, all the challenging
party need show is that the prospective juror has heard or read
something about the case. At the other pole is the view that knowl-
edge is relevant only to the extent that it undermines the ability to
maintain an open mind. Jurors who assert that they can set aside
pretrial information and decide the case on the merits, if believed by
the judge, will not be disqualified for cause despite their knowledge.
In between these two extremes lies room for a variety of ap-
proaches based on a presumed relationship between knowledge and
impartiality. One approach, for example, would be to look at the
effect the knowledge would likely have on a reasonable person. A
refinement would look to the effect on a reasonable person with the
particular juror's characteristics. Both of these approaches, resting
167 See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
168 See U.S. CONST. amend. VL
169 See W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 670 (J. Ehrlich ed. 1959).
170 See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
171 This practice was clearly permissible at an early stage in the development of the
jury. See W. FORS=', supra note 13, at 163-65. However, at that time jurors could be
punished for bringing in false verdicts. When this practice, known as the attaint, fell
into disfavor, so did that of permitting jurors to return verdicts based on their own
knowledge. Id. at 165-66.
172 See, e.g., McKain v. Love, 2 Hill 506, 27 Am. Dec. 401 (S.C. 1834). See generally
Hassett, supra note 23.
173 See infra notes 174-95 and accompanying text.
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as they do on a presumed relationship, constitute a tacit acknowl-
edgement of the difficulty in determining the effect of knowledge on
an actual juror.
Just as the description of the recipient of the knowledge can be
altered, so too can the strength of the presumption be ratchetted. A
court could presume impartiality despite admitted knowledge with
the challenging party bearing the burden of demonstrating partial-
ity. Conversely, a court could presume partiality once knowledge
was admitted, with the side seeking to seat the juror having the bur-
den of rebutting the presumption.
The Supreme Court's position on the relationship between
knowledge and impartiality is difficult to pin down. Irvin v. Dowd 174
represented a major attempt by the Court to wrestle with the issue.
The Court began with a recognition of the practical problems
involved:
It is not required.., that the jurors be totally ignorant of the facts and
issues involved. In these days of swift, widespread and diverse meth-
ods of communication, an important case can be expected to arouse
the interest of the public in the vicinity, and scarcely any of those best
qualified to serve as jurors will not have formed some impression or
opinion as to the merits of the case. This is particularly true in criminal
cases. To hold that the mere existence of any preconceived notion as
to the guilt or innocence of an accused, without more, is sufficient to
rebut the presumption of a prospective juror's impartiality would be to
establish an impossible standard. It is sufficient if the juror can lay
aside his impression or opinion and render a verdict based on the evi-
dence presented in court. 175
The Court thus appeared to presume impartiality. It placed the bur-
den of rebuttal on the challenging party: "Unless he shows the ac-
tual existence of such an opinion in the mind of the juror as will
raise the presumption of partiality, the juror need not necessarily be
set aside .... ",176
In applying this test to the facts of the case, however, the Court
seemed to do a somersault. It found that persistent and prejudicial
news coverage had so permeated the community as to make imparti-
ality impossible. 177 The Court chose to disbelieve the declarations
of some impanelled jurors that they could render an impartial ver-
dict. It tendered its own analysis of the psychological processes at
work:
174 366 U.S. 717 (1961).
175 Id. at 722-23.
176 Id. at 723 (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 157 (1878)). See also
Marshall v. United States, 360 U.S. 310 (1959) (presuming prejudice on the part of pro-
spective jurors who knew of the defendant's record).
177 Irvin, 366 U.S. at 725.
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The influence that lurks in an opinion once formed is so persistent
that it unconsciously fights detachment from the mental processes of
the average man .... No doubt each juror was sincere when he said
that he would be fair and impartial to petitioner, but psychological im-
pact requiring such a declaration before one's fellows is often its
father. 17 8
Thus, the Court in fact may have presumed partiality rather than
impartiality and adopted a theory of opinion formation that made
rebutting this presumption virtually impossible. The Court may
well have been correct, but it provided no empirical evidence to
support its reasoning.
The Court tilted even more towards the position that knowl-
edge per se is unacceptable in Rideau v. Louisiana.'79 A local televi-
sion station had on several occasions broadcast the defendant's
confession to the crimes with which he was charged. Given the cir-
cumstances, the Supreme Court held that the refusal of the de-
fense's request for a change of venue denied the defendant due
process.180 This unremarkable holding was supplemented by reflec-
tions on the more general question of the desirability of "knowl-
edgeable" jurors. Justice Stewart, speaking for the majority,
observed:
For anyone who has ever watched television the conclusion cannot be
avoided that this spectacle, to the tens of thousands of people who saw
and heard it, in a very real sense was Rideau's trial-at which he
pleaded guilty to murder. Any subsequent court proceedings in a
community so pervasively exposed to such a spectacle could be but a
hollow formality.18 '
Furthermore, the Court did not find it necessary to inquire whether
any individual juror's impartiality had been affected:
[W]e do not hesitate to hold, without pausing to examine a particular-
ized transcript of the voir dire examination of the members of the jury,
that due process of law in this case required a trial before ajury drawn
from a community of people who had not seen and heard Rideau's
178 Id. at 728. See also ABA Advisory Comm. on Fair Trial and Free Press, Standards
Relating to Fair Trial and Free Press (1968):
[S]tudies indicate that people tend to form beliefs on a minimum of information
and that because of the desire for social approval, they often attempt to reflect the
opinions and beliefs 6f others. Available data also suggest that once formed, an
impression or belief is extemely difficult to change, even when the individual is con-
fronted with objective facts that tend to refute it .... In other words, the individual
is likely to select those elements of observed phenomena which reinforce his pre-
existing beliefs and to neglect others or even to distort his perceptions so that they
will confirm his beliefs.
Id. at 62.
17) 373 U.S. 723 (1963).
180 Id. at 726.
181 Id. (emphasis in original).
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televised "interview." 18 2
While the decision may have turned on the extreme facts of the case,
the Court's language, besides suggesting the extraordinary proposi-
tion that the lower court should have granted a change in venue
even if none of the jurors had seen or were aware of the television
broadcast, appeared to indicate that impartiality presumes lack of
knowledge about the facts of a case.
The Court retreated from its Rideau position in Murphy v. Flor-
ida,' 1 3 holding that mere exposure of some jurors to adverse public-
ity about the defendant did not presumptively deny him due
process. 8 4 Significantly, the Court did what it had declined to do in
Rideau, examining the transcript of the voir dire to determine
whether any of the jurors were in fact biased against the accused. 8 5
Although previous cases were distinguished as involving widespread
community bias,' 8 6 the Court provided no scientific support for its
inference that such community bias rendered individual jurors' as-
sertions of impartiality less reliable.
The per se linking of impartiality with knowledge is questiona-
ble. One effect is to penalize well-read citizens. The better in-
formed a person is on current events, the less likely that person will
satisfy a conception of impartiality which views advance knowledge
as undesirable. 8 7 Individuals who, in most respects, would be con-
sidered model citizens will be deemed unfit for jury duty. The
seemingly inevitable result will be juries representative of the "aver-
age stupidity."'188 Regardless of whether such stupidity is reflective
of the community, it is doubtful that this is what the Supreme Court
had in mind when it called for ajury drawn from a fair cross-section
of the community. Indeed, it would seem that eliminating the more
knowledgeable portion of the population from jury duty would be at
odds with the requirement of cross-section representation. A blue
182 Id. at 727.
183 421 U.S. 794 (1975).
184 Id. at 796.
185 Id. at 800-02.
186 Id. at 802-03.
187 There is a subtle irony between the common practice of drawing jury panels from
voting lists, thereby selecting persons with an interest in public affairs, while seeking
actual jurors not knowledgable about the case because they do not keep up with current
events.
188 H. Spencer, Representative Government, in ESSAYS: MORAL, POLITICAL, AND AES-
THETIC 182 (1868), quoted in Hassett, supra note 23, at 156. See also United States v.
Mesarosh, 116 F. Supp. 345, 348 (W.D. Pa. 1953), aft'd, 223 F.2d 449 (3d Cir. 1955),
rev'd. 352 U.S. I (1956)("[T]o obtain a juror who would make the right' answer (from
defendants' point of view) to the question propounded, he or she would have to be a
person who had lived in a vacuum, or was an imbecile, or a communist.").
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ribbon panel composed only of the best informed and most intelli-
gent members of society may not be the objective,18 9 but neither is
its opposite. Furthermore, in an era in which news coverage is con-
stantly expanding and in which information in a wide variety of
forms is readily available, finding an unknowledgeable juror in a
highly publicized case may not be an easy task.190
While the Supreme Court appeared at one time to be drifting
towards the position that knowledge is inconsistent with impartial-
ity,' 9 ' the more pertinent inquiry is the extent to which knowledge
has affected impartiality. The focus should be on the "animus" of
the individual juror. Only when a juror's ability to decide the case
fairly and justly has been compromised by the information or knowl-
edge to which he or she has been exposed should the juror be dis-
qualified. This is not a concession to the pervasiveness of the
modern media's coverage of news but a return to principles enunci-
ated at an earlier stage in United States history. In the context of
the treason trial of Aaron Burr, 19 2 Chief Justice Marshall discussed
juror knowledge and impartiality against the backdrop of a series of
inflammatory articles published by the local press:
Were it possible to obtain a jury without any prepossessions whatever
respecting the guilt or innocence of the accused, it would be extremely
desirable to obtain such a jury, but this is perhaps impossible; and
therefore will not be required. The opinion which has been avowed by
the court is, that light impressions which may fairly be supposed to
yield to the testimony that may be offered, which may leave the mind
open to a fair consideration of that testimony, constitute no sufficient
objection to ajuror; but that those strong and deep impressions which
will close the mind against the testimony that may be offered in oppo-
sition to them, which will combat that testimony, and resist its force,
do constitute a sufficient objection to him.' 93
The vulnerable point in this analysis is the assumption that faint
189 Compare Thiel v. Southern Pacific Co., 328 U.S. 217, 224 (1946)(jury is not "the
province of the economically and socially privileged") and Glasser v. United States, 315
U.S. 60, 86 (1942)(jury is not to be "the organ of any special group or class") with Fay v.
New York, 332 U.S. 261 (1947)(approving use of blue ribbon jury). See generally Dubois,
Desirability of Blue Ribbon Juries, 13 HASTINGS L.J. 479 (1962); Note, The Blue Ribbon Jury,
60 HARV. L. REV. 613 (1947).
190 In Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 549 n.3 (1976), the Supreme
Court questioned whether a fair trial was even possible in a highly publicized national
crime, such as the killing of President Kennedy and his murderer, Lee Harvey Oswald.
See generally Hassett, supra note 23; Padawer, Singer and Barton, Impact of Practical Public-
ity on Juror's Verdicts in THE JURY SYSTEM IN AMERICA: A CRITICAL OVERVIEW (R. Simon
ed. 1975).
191 See supra notes 174-82 and accompanying text.
192 United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 49 (C.C.D. Va. 1807)(No. 14,692g).
193 Id. at 50-51.
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impressions 194 can be set aside. Psychologically this may not be so,
and in any event the hypothesis must be explored on an individual
basis. Even a faint impression may make an indelible, albeit unap-
preciated, impact on a particular juror's psyche. Expert evaluation
may be needed to make this determination. Although this may be
time consuming and difficult, the alternative of disqualifying all
knowledgeable jurors may be worse. To again quote Chief Justice
Marshall:
It would seem to the court that to say that any man who had formed an
opinion on any fact conducive to the final decision of the case would
therefore be considered as disqualified from serving on the jury,
would exclude intelligent and observing men, whose minds were really
in a situation to decide upon the whole case according to the testi-
mony, and would perhaps be applying the letter of the rule requiring
an impartial jury with a strictness which is not necessary for the preser-
vation of the rule itself.1 95
Chief Justice Marshall's opinion points the way to the relevant
considerations in analyzing the proper relationship between knowl-
edge and impartiality: 1) knowledge on the part of the jurors is
more or less inevitable; 2) the more intelligent and well informed
the potential juror, the more likely he or she is to know something
about the case; 3) persons generally knowledgeable about public af-
fairs will in most instances be more discerning jurors than those
who are generally ignorant about public affairs; 4) a juror's imparti-
ality is compromised only to the extent that the juror's knowledge
impedes a decision on the merits; and 5) whether ajuror's impartial-
ity has in fact been compromised by knowledge must be determined
on an individual basis. In short, recognition that a particular juror
possesses information relating to a case must be the start, not the
end, of the inquiry.
IV. THE MYTH OF THE IMPARTIAL JUROR
The Supreme Court's approach to impartiality has been one of
indirection. Both its equal protection and cross-section representa-
tion decisions appear aimed at preserving social and democratic val-
ues having relatively little relationship to impartiality. Rarely, if
ever, have the Justices paused to examine individual juror impartial-
ity. Yet, at its roots, "[j]uroi- competence is an individual rather
than a group or class matter." 196
194 Part of the problem, of course, lies in defining what constitutes a "faint
impression."
195 Burr, 25 F. Cas. at 51.
196 Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187, 193 (1946)(quoting Thiel v. Southern Pa-
cific Co., 328 U.S. 217. 220 (1946)).
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The courts that have dealt with juror knowledge have ap-
proached the issue of impartiality somewhat less obliquely. 197
Those which equate knowledge with partiality, either directly or via
a presumption, engage in a questionable class generalization: not
all members of the class are similarly affected. On the other hand,
the knowledge cases can more appropriately be construed to require
some showing of an adverse effect of publicity or other pretrial in-
formation on a juror's ability to maintain an open mind. The focus
is then correctly on the mind of the individual juror. The object is
to identify and exclude jurors who would base their verdict on the
information received prior to trial, rather than on the evidence
presented at trial.
For legal purposes, impartiality is more than the absence of par-
tiality. If partiality is viewed as a negative and its absence a neutral
state, impartiality is a positive state encompassing a constellation of
juror traits. Impartial jurors must detach themselves from pretrial
prejudices and suspend judgment until after hearing the proof
presented by both sides. They must accept the institutional biases
of the legal system, such as the presumption of innocence and the
requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. They must be
open to persuasion and be willing to consider the arguments of
counsel and the views of other jurors. They must strive to follow
the instructions of thejudge.198 They must base their verdict on the
evidence and the inferences to be drawn therefrom, tempering their
decisions, when appropriate, with a principled sense of justice. If
these conditions are present, it does not really matter for purposes
of impartiality whether a juror received knowledge about the case
prior to trial, whether the jury was drawn from or was 'representative
of a cross-section of the community, whether the jury's values re-
flected community values, or whether the jury was selected pursuant
to a process that excluded certain segments of society from eligibil-
ity for service. 199
197 See supra notes 172-93 and accompanying text.
198 Unfortunately, it may be that many jurors are unable to comprehend judicial in-
structions. This should not be suprising. Lawyers andjudges receive at least three years
of formal instruction in law school and often need many additional years of practical
experience to fully grasp the subtleties of legal rules and principles whose meanings
often divide appellate judges. SeeJ. FRANK, supra note 7, at 116-18. Moreover, the jury
does not receive its instructions until after it has heard the evidence. Thus, it may not
pay particular attention to certain testimony because at the time it does not perceive its
legal significance. Given the shroud of secrecy which surrounds juror deliberations, it is
difficult to discover whether jurors in fact understood a judge's instructions. In any
event, judges should try to deliver instructions using ordinary language in ways that are
familiar to ordinary citizens.
199 It is not that these concerns are not worthy ofjudicial attention. Indeed, they are
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Indeed, this analysis can be taken one step further. Except for
purposes of appearance, it may not matter whether jurors as individ-
uals or the jury as an entity is impartial so long as the jury delibera-
tion process is impartial. Selection of impartial jurors is only a
means of achieving the end of impartial decision making. The need
to focus on a priori juror impartiality stems from the inability to ex-
amine the impartiality of the decision making process in the Anglo-
American legal system. It is a part of the price the system pays for
its reluctance to expose juror deliberations to critical scrutiny or to
require jurors to provide reasons for their verdict. Serendipitously,
the decision to concentrate on juror impartiality rather than on the
impartiality of the deliberation process may have been an enlight-
ened one. One of the intriguing findings of Kalven and Zeisel200 in
their classic study of the American jury is that jurors often make up
their minds before they retire, with deliberations serving only to so-
lidify initial inclinations and to bring about unanimity.201 If so, im-
partial decision making is critically dependent on individual juror
impartiality.
Identifying in general terms characteristics which would inter-
fere with juror impartiality is not particularly difficult.20 2 More diffi-
cult is to identify biased jurors in practice, and most difficult of all is
to identify the desired entity itself, the impartial juror. The reasons
for the difficulties are both methodological and substantive.
so deserving of judicial attention that they should be addressed directly, and not con-
fused with issues of impartiality. In Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), for exam-
ple, the Supreme Court based its decision that peremptory challenges could not be
constitutionally used to systematically exclude blacks from juries trying black defendants
on equal protection, rather than on the sixth amendment. Id. at 89.
200 H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, supra note 18.
201 Id. at 488-89.
202 The various disqualifying characteristics which inhibit open-mindedness in a juror
can be catalogued as general or particular. General disqualifying characteristics relate
to infirmities which would render a person incompetent to serve as a juror in any trial.
Those within this category might include aliens, children, prisoners, and the mentally ill.
See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1865 (1982).
Particular disqualifying characteristics are those which would not render the juror
unfit to serve in all cases, but only in the particular case for which the juror is called.
The juror may be prejudiced against the group of which the defendant is a member, or
against the defendant as an individual. The bias may be a function of the relationship of
the juror to the parties or their lawyers, as when ajuror is a relative; or the juror's direct
interest in the result in the case, as when a juror stands to gain financially from the
verdict; or merely when a verdict will vindicate a strongly held belief, as when a crusader
against pornography sits on an obscenity case. The juror may admit bias, or admit facts,
values, or attitudes from which bias can be presumed. See United States v. Corey, 625
F.2d 704, 707 (5th Cir. 1980), cert denied, 450 U.S. 925 (1981).
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A. METHODOLOGICAL DEFICIENCIES IN THE SEARCH FOR THE
IMPARTIAL JUROR
Voir dire is the primary legal tool for selecting a jury.20 3 Each
side is permitted to question jurors. From their responses, the law-
yers attempt to assess partiality. An attorney may challenge for
cause the juror believed to be partial20 4 or, if this is unsuccessful,
excuse the juror by exercise of a peremptory challenge. 20 5
Voir dire can be quite time consuming, especially when lawyers,
as they are prone to do, use it to indoctrinate jurors or to establish a
203 See generally Babcock, supra note 73; Gutman, supra note 91.
204 In exercising a challenge for cause, an attorney must supply the judge with well-
founded reasons why a particular juror will be unable to decide the case fairly or impar-
tially. There is, in contrast with peremptory challenges, no limit to the number of chal-
lenges for cause which can be made by each side. The grounds for challenges for cause
are generally fixed by statute.
205 An attorney need not give any reason for a peremptory challenge, and the chal-
lenge may not be rejected by the court, as may one for cause. The number of such
challenges allotted to each side is usually fixed by statute. See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P.
24(b). Attorneys will generally use peremptory challenges to strike jurors whom they
believe may be biased but whom the court has refused to strike for cause. See Hayes v.
Missouri, 120 U.S. 68, 70 (1887). Some lawyers believe that the very attempt to have a
juror struck for cause may have alienated the juror against the attorney and for this
reason will excuse thejuror. See Lewis v. United States, 146 U.S. 370, 376 (1892). More
simply, a lawyer may peremptorily challenge jurors before whom the attorney would feel
uncomfortable in trying the case. See id. See generally Note, Survey of the Law of Peremptory
Challenges: Uncertainty in the Criminal Law, 44 U. Prlr. L. REV. 673 (1983).
There does not appear to be any constitutional right to peremptory challenges. See
Stilson v. United States, 250 U.S. 583, 586 (1919). Nevertheless, while the question has
not been without dispute, courts tend to permit voir dire questions for the purpose of
allowing the attorney to engage in the intelligent and informed exercise of peremptory
challenges. See, e.g., United States v. Dellinger, 472 F.2d 340, 368 (7th Cir. 1972), cert.
denied, 410 U.S. 970 (1973); People v. Williams, 29 Cal. 3d 392, 628 P.2d 869, 174 Cal.
Rptr. 319 (1981).
The use of peremptory challenges to exclude all blacks from a jury trying a black
defendant is unconstitutional. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). The Court in
Batson stated that "the Equal Protection Clause forbids the prosecutor to challenge po-
tential jurors solely on account of their race or on the assumption that black jurors as a
group will be unable impartially to consider the state's case against a black defendant."
Id. at 89.
Contrary to the position taken in Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965), the Batson
Court held that a defendant need not establish a pattern of discriminatory challenges
over time but could base his claim on racially premised peremptory challenges in his
own case. Batson, 476 U.S. at 93. To establish a prima facie case of discrimination the
defendant has to show that he is a member of a cognizable racial group, and that the
prosecutor had exercised peremptory challenges to remove members of defendant's
race from the venire. Id. at 93-94. The defendant can rely on the potential for discrimi-
nation inherent in peremptory challenges. Id. at 94. The defendant must show that the
facts and other relevant circumstances raise an inference of discrimination. Id. The bur-
den then shifts to the government to provide a neutral explanation for the challenges.
Id. Interestingly, the Court in Batson gave no indication that its decision would apply to
situations other than race based challenges.
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rapport with them.20 6 To accelerate the proceedings, many judges
have assumed responsibility for questioning prospective jurors. 20 7
Alternatively, a court may limit the time or scope of voir dire208 or
require that questions be addressed to the jurors collectively. 20 9 All
of these restrictions impede the effectiveness of voir dire as a means
206 See Broeder, Voir Dire Examinations: An Empirical Study, 38 S. CAL. L. REV. 503, 522
(1965)(approximately 80% of voir dire spent in an attempt to indoctrinate jurors). In
Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501 (1984), the voir dire had lasted
over six weeks. ChiefJustice Burger noted that such voir dire undermined public confi-
dence in the courts and the legal profession. Id. at 510 n. 9. He also noted that in
response to a question, counsel had said that it was not unknown for jury selection in
California to take six months. Id. See generally Fried, Kaplan and Klein,Juror Selection: An
Analysis of Voir Dire in THE JURY SYSTEM IN AMERICA: A CRITICAL OVERIEw 47 (R. Simon
ed. 1975); Campbell, The Multiple Functions of the Criminal Defense Voir Dire in Texas, 1 AM.J.
CRIM. L. 255, 271-72 (1972).
207 See Levit, Nelson, Ball, & Chernick, Expediting Voir Dire: An Empirical Study, 44 S.
CAL. L. REV. 916 (1971); Suggs & Sales,Juror Self-Disclosure in the Voir Dire: A Social Science
Analysis, 56 IND. LJ. 245, 250-53 (1981). The judicial authority for this practice is pro-
vided in the federal system by FED. R. CRIM. P. 24(a). For the view that voir dire should
be left to counsel, see Gutman, supra note 91. A full discussion of the issue of who
should conduct voir dire can be found in People v. Crowe, 8 Cal. 3d 815, 506 P.2d 193,
106 Cal. Rptr. 369 (1973).
208 See United States v. Nance, 502 F.2d 615, 620 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S.
926 (1975); United States v. Delay, 500 F.2d 1360, 1366 (8th Cir. 1974); United States v.
Grant, 494 F.2d 120 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 849 (1979). See also Suggs & Sales,
supra note 207, at 251.
Some limitations on the scope of voir dire may be unconstitutional. Ham v. South
Carolina, 409 U.S. 524 (1973), provides an instructive illustration. The Supreme Court
held that under the circumstances, limitations on voir dire relating to juror racial bias
were unconstitutional, but limitations on questions about jurors' attitudes towards per-
sons with beards were not. The defendant, a bearded black accused of a drug offense,
claimed he had been framed for his civil rights activities. The Court expressed concern
about the limitless scope of voir dire if it opened the door by allowing inquiry into juror
attitudes toward men with beards: "Given the traditionally broad discretion accorded to
the trial judge in conducting voir dire... and our inability to constitutionally distinguish
possible prejudice against beards from a host of other possible similar prejudices, we do
not believe the petitioner's constitutional rights were violated .... Id. at 528. See also
Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28, 36 (1986) ("By refusing to question prospective jurors on
racial prejudice, the trial judge failed to adequately protect petitioner's constitutional
right to an impartial jury."); Morford v. United States, 339 U.S. 258 (1950); Dennis v.
United States, 339 U.S. 162 (1950)(right to inquire on voir dire about attitudes towards
persons with Communist leanings). But see Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.S. 589 (1976) (distin-
guishing Ham on the basis of the particular circumstances of the case, and holding that
the mere fact that defendant was black and the victim was white did not require the trial
judge to allow voir dire relating to a juror's racial prejudice); Rosales-Lopez v. United
States, 451 U.S. 182 (1981)(no special circumstances requiring voir dire regarding prej-
udice towards Mexicans).
209 See Ham, 409 U.S. at 527; United States v. Gerald, 624 F.2d 1291, 1296 (5th Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 920 (1981); United States v. Bearden, 423 F.2d 805, 811 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 836 (1970); Suggs & Sales, supra note 207, at 258-59. Some
courts have suggested that the better practice is to conduct individual voir dire examina-
tions. See, e.g., United States v. Starks, 515 F.2d 112, 115 (3d Cir. 1975); United States v.
Bear Runner, 502 F.2d 908 (8th Cir. 1974).
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of detecting partiality.210 Lawyers may also be reluctant to alienate
prospective jurors by asking probing questions or by implying any-
thing other than full confidence in ajuror's ability to decide the case
fairly.211
Realistically, except in the most blatant cases, it is naive to ex-
pect to determine impartiality from voir dire. Trained psychiatrists
require intensive observation and analysis over an extended time
period to understand a patient's psyche. It seems highly unlikely
that lawyers can accurately evaluate a juror from the juror's re-
sponses to perfunctory inquiries, especially since juror statements
about themselves are not very reliable. Persons who are unaware of
their subconscious biases will deny them when questioned.2 12
Those who are aware may not admit their bias, because of either an
unwillingness to confess publicly this perceived character flaw213 or
an overriding desire to serve on thejury.214 At another extreme are
those jurors who try to please an attorney by giving the responses
they think the attorney wants to hear.
Voir dire as a search for impartial jurors also breaks down be-
cause lawyers look not for impartial jurors but for jurors partial to
their side, whom they want to keep, and jurors partial to the oppos-
ing side, whom they want to excuse. Lawyers are thus attuned for
indicia of partiality for or against their clients, but not for the char-
acter traits necessary for impartial decision making. Often attorneys
will exercise peremptory challenges against intelligent and discern-
210 See Babcock, supra note 73; Fahringer, supra note 7. Arguably, the greater control
the court exercises over voir dire, the more likely that parties will turn to pre-trial inves-
tigation ofjurors to determine their leanings. See infra notes 215-16 and accompanying
text.
211 R. Blunk & B. Sales, Persuasion During the Voir Dire in PSYCHOLOGY IN THE LEGAL
PROCESS 43 (B. Sales ed. 1977); Kuhn, supra note 7, at 244.
212 See People v. McCray, 57 N.Y.2d 542, 547, 443 N.E.2d 915, 918, 457 N.Y.S.2d
441, 444 (1982)(citing FRIENDLY & GOLDFARB, CRIME AND PUBLICITY 103 (1967)).
213 See United States v. Dellinger, 472 F.2d 340, 375 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410
U.S. 970 (1973)("Natural human pride would suggest a negative answer to whether
there was a reason the juror could not be fair and impartial."); McCray, 57 N.Y. 2d at
547, 443 N.E.2d at 918, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 444. Fahringer reported on a National Jury
Project study in which interviews indicated that 71% of the community wherein a highly
publicized murder was to be tried had fixed opinions about the defendant's guilt, yet
only 15% of the jurors admitted to any predisposition during voir dire. Fahringer, supra
note 7, at 117. He concluded that "[Tihis disparity between the survey results and the
uncovering of bias during the voir dire can be explained only be a lack of honesty on the
jurors' part." Id. at 118. See also A. MORRILL, ANATOMY OF A TRIAL 5 (1968); Saltzburg &
Powers, supra note 47, at 355.
214 See Broeder, supra note 206, at 510-15, 528; Fahringer, supra note 7, at 117-18;
Saltzburg & Powers, supra note 47, at 355. Indeed, the most biased juror may be the
juror least likely to admit bias, in order to have the opportunity to give vent to that bias
in the verdict.
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ing persons, preferring to try their case to jurors with more mallea-
ble minds. Similarly struck will be strong willed individuals, likely to
be able to persuade others of their position, because an attorney will
not want to rest the client's fate in the hands of one person. Those
perceived to be on the extreme, whether ideologically, politically, or
economically, are also prime candidates for being challenged pe-
remptorily. The end result is ajury that not only may fail to reflect a
true cross-section of the community, but also a jury that may not
necessarily be any more impartial than a randomly selected jury.
Voir dire is often supplemented by the investigation of mem-
bers of the venire prior to trial. Assuming the names are available,
defense attorneys can hire commercial jury investigation services or
private detectives to investigate potential jurors, or conduct such in-
vestigation themselves. Prosecutors often use the police or other
state officials for like purposes.2 15 These investigations pose obvi-
ous threats to juror privacy.2 16 In addition, a difference in the re-
sources between parties will result in an uneven use of such
investigations, based on the resources of the parties rather than on
the needs of the case. The modern trend to enlist trained social
scientists to conduct demographic studies of the community in
which the trial is to occur, construct psychological profiles of the
ideal juror based on those studies, and rank jurors by observing
their body language and paralanguistic cues during voir dire217 ex-
acerbates this imbalance.
B. SUBSTANTIVE PROBLEMS IN THE SEARCH FOR THE IMPARTIAL
JUROR
The analysis of the methodological difficulties in identifying im-
partial jurors threatens to mask a more fundamental, intrinsic, and
theoretical defect: there may not be such a creature as an impartial
juror. The original concept of the impartial juror as one without
discernible bias or private interest in the outcome of the case re-
flected society's relatively unsophisticated understanding of the
human mind. The effects of childhood training and experiences, as
well as the role of subconscious motivations, were not fully appreci-
ated. The processes by which biases and prejudices, which form an
215 See generally Okun, Investigation ofJurors by Counsel: Its Impact on the Decisional Process,
56 GEo. L.J. 839 (1968).
216 In Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 85-86 n.6 (1986), however, the Court referred
to this practice but declined to condemn it. But see United States v. Barnes, 604 F.2d 121
(2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 907 (1980)(upholding refusal of trial judge to dis-
close names and addresses of jurors in order to protect their privacy).
217 See supra notes 9-10 and accompanying text.
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integral, albeit an often denied, 21 8 part of human personality, come
into being were not understood. These more subtle, hidden biases
were to a large extent ignored in early conceptions about
impartiality.
Modem psychological studies have contributed greatly to our
understanding of human nature. Freud and his followers have made
us aware that subconscious factors may affect everyday activity. 21 9 It
would be remarkable if persons acting in the capacity ofjurors were
somehow immune from these subconscious influences. 220 Long
standing opinions, values, and beliefs cannot be checked like a hat at
the jury room door. The Supreme Court was probably correct when
it observed in Irvin v. Dowd 22 1 that "[the influence that lurks in an
opinion once formed is so persistent that it unconsciously fights de-
tachment from the mental processes of the average man." 222
Although the Court was referring to the effects of pretrial publicity,
the point can be extended to all life experiences. 223 For example,
Kalven and Zeisel found that one significant factor leading to dis-
agreements between judge and jury over the verdict was the defend-
ant's attractiveness. 224 Sympathetic defendants elicited greater
juror leniency. 225 But what causes a defendant to evoke sympathy?
218 Denial is a quite understandable phenomenon. Few persons want to admit their
prejudices. Most persons would like to believe that they are not prejudiced. Justice
Marshall made a similar point in Batson in relation to the prosecutor's use of peremptory
challenges to exclude blacks from juries of black defendants. The majority had found
such practices to be unconstitutional. Justice Marshall, focusing on the issue of proving
the prosecutor's motive, observed that it is not so much that prosecutors will lie about
their motives, but that they will deceive themselves out of an understandable human
desire not to admit their subconscious prejudices. Id. at 1728 (Marshall,J., concurring).
219 See S. FREUD, THE PSYCHOTHERAPY OF EVERYDAY LIFE (A. Brill ed. 1948); C. JUNG,
PSYCHOLOGY OF THE UNCONSCIOUS (1950). See also H. ELLENBURGER, THE DISCOVERY OF
THE UNCONSCIOUS (1970); L. FREY-ROHN, FROM FREUD TO JUNG: A COMPARATIVE STUDY
OF THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE UNCONSCIOUS (1974); G. GRODDICK, EXPLORING THE UNCON-
scious (1950).
220 One can argue that persons may not be as affected by their biases in their capacity
as jurors as they may in other situations because the judge admonishes them to act im-
partially. In their everyday affairs jurors do not receive such reminders, and when they
do, it is not by someone with the authority of a judge.
221 366 U.S. 717 (1961).
222 Id. at 727.
223 See H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, supra note 18, at 131-32. See generally J. FANK, supra
note 7. One study reported that jurors spent slightly over one-fifth of their time discuss-
ing their own experiences. James, Status and Competence of Jurors, 64 AM. J. Soc. 563
(1959).
224 H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, supra note 18, at ch. 15.
225 Id. See also Efran, The Effect of Physical Appearance on theJudgment of Guilt, Interpersonal
Attraction, and Severity of Recommended Punishment in a Simulated Jury Task, 8J. RES. IN PER-
SONALITY 45 (1974); Nemeth & Sosis, A Simulated Jury Study: Characteristics of the Defendant
and the Jurors, 90 J. SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 221 (1973); Sigall & Ostrove, Beautiful But Danger-
ous: Effects of Offender Attractiveness and Nature of the Crime onJuridicJudgment, 31 J. PERSON-
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Kalven and Zeisel did not probe the issue, but in part jurors may be
responding to characteristics in a defendant which remind them of
sympathetic persons with whom they have had contact. Similarly,
Kalven and Zeisel discovered that jurors were less inclined to con-
vict for an activity, such as gambling 226 or reckless driving,227 in
which they themselves had engaged.
A juror's values and life experiences may affect the juror's per-
ception of the parties and their witnesses, 228 the issues, and the
facts. Ajuror is in effect a witness to the events of a trial, with all the
shortcomings of a witness. 229 If the mannerisms of a party, witness,
or attorney remind the juror of a disfavored relative, the juror may
subconsciously react negatively to that person's side.230 Bias may
seep in despite the juror's lack of personal acquaintance with any of
the principals.
Jurors also tend to have general philosophical predispositions
about the issues of a case. An unhappy sexual encounter, long for-
gotten or long remembered, may surface in a pornography or sod-
omy prosecution. The particular occurrence which leads to the
juror's attitude may be undiscoverable. Often one's attitudes are
the product of a series of minor incidents, the cumulative effect of
which may be devastating. There now exists, for instance, fairly
ALrrv & Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 410 (1975). But see Friend & Vinson, Leaning Over Backwards:
Jurors' Response to Defendants' Attractiveness, 24 J. CoMM. 124 (1974).
226 H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, supra note 18, at 291.
227 Id. at 326.
228 In Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28 (1986), Justice Brennan explained that:
[S]ubconscious, as well as express, racial fears and hatred operate to deny fairness
to the person despised; that is why we seek to ensure that the right to an impartial
jury is a meaningful right by providing the defense with the opportunity to ask pro-
spective jurors questions designed to expose even hidden prejudices . . . [M]ight
not the ... juror be influenced by those same prejudices in deciding whether, for
example, to credit or discredit white witnesses as opposed to black witnesses ....
Id. at 42 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
229 See J. FRANK, supra note 7, at 153. Frank's analysis pertained to judges, but his
point is equally applicable to jurors. The troublesome aspect of this observation relates
to the reference to witnesses. Even if the legal system could analyze juror attitudes and
excuse those jurors psychologically predisposed to one side or the other, it would be
hard pressed to anticipate a juror's reaction to a witness. A mannerism of a witness may
trigger an association in a juror's mind that causes the juror to be biased against the
witness and the side presenting the witness. Prior to the testimony, it would be virtually
impossible to predict this effect.
230 See id., at ch. 10. See also Turner, 476 U.S. at 43 (Brennan,J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (subconscious prejudice denies fair trials to those who are the object
of the prejudice) and supra note 205. To avoid this difficulty, the legal system could
permit jurors to see only a transcript of the testimony of a witness. Unfortunately, this
cure might be worse than the disease, as jurors would be deprived of non-verbal indicia
of truthfulness. See Miller & Boster, Three Images of the Trial: Their Implications for Psycho-
logical Research in PSYCHOLOGY IN THE LEGAL PROCESS, 29-34 (B. Sales ed. 1977).
320 [Vol. 79
IN SEARCH OF THE IMPARTIAL JURY
convincing evidence that "authoritarian" personalities are prone to
favor the state's case.231 Identifying the totality of experiences
which result in the formation of an "authoritarian" personality may
be impossible.
Even the facts of a case, seemingly subject to objective ascer-
tainment, are filtered through ajuror's life history. Ajuror may dis-
believe a factual scenario which conflicts with the juror's personal
experiences. 232 Evidence may not be as much an intrinsic entity as a
reflection of the personality and values of the jurors. 233 In this re-
gard, juror diversity may enhance accurate fact finding. Since
human perception tends to be selective, facts which contradict one's
beliefs may be ignored. Homogeneous juries, whose members
share a common background, values, and attitudes, will tend to ig-
nore the same facts. A heterogeneous jury, where different jurors
see different parts of the picture, is mote likely to come up with a
sense of the whole. 234 Juror diversity, thus, serves a different func-
tion with respect to fact gathering than it is commonly attributed in
cross-section representation cases, in which it is seen as introducing
a broad spectrum of community values into the decision making
process.
The vagueness of controlling legal principles contributes to the
extent personal factors have in affecting ajuror's deliberations. In a
criminal case, the prosecutor must establish the guilt of the accused
beyond a reasonable doubt. While all jurors may unequivocally ac-
cept this standard, the amount of proof required to create a "rea-
sonable doubt" in an individual juror's mind may be a function of
the juror's personality. 235
231 See Boehm, Mr. Prejudice, Miss Sympathy and the Authoritarian Personality: An Applica-
tion of Psychological Measuring Techniques to the Problem ofJury Bias, 1968 Wis. L. REV. 734
(1968); Buckhout, Licker, Alexander, Gambardella, Eugenio & Kakoullis, Discretion in
Jury Selection in SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY AND DISCRETIONARY LAW 176 (L. Abt & I. Stuart eds
1979); Note, Juror Bias - A Practical Screening Device and the Case for Permitting Its Use, 64
MINN. L. REV. 987 (1980).
232 See Hovey v. Superior Court, 28 Cal.3d 1, 24-25, 616 P.2d 1301, 1313, 168 Cal.
Rptr. 128, 140 (1980).
233 See Hepburn, The Objective Reality of Evidence and the Utility of Systematic Juy Selection, 4
LAW AND HUM. BEHAV. 89 (1980); Zeisel & Diamond, The Effect of Peremptory Challenges on
Jury Verdict: An Experiment in a Federal District Court, 30 STAN. L. REV. 491, 531 (1978). The
fact that jurors so often disagree on the first ballot, some 69% of the time in criminal
cases according to H. KALVEN AND H. ZEISEL, supra note 18, at 488, despite having heard
the same evidence and arguments, attests to the effect of personality differences on the
perception of evidence.
234 See Hovey, 28 Cal.3d at 23-25, 616 P.2d at 1312-13, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 139-40.
235 See People v. Carmichael, 198 Cal. 534, 545, 246 P. 62, 67 (1926). Again, diversity
may help forge standards acceptable to all the jurors. Hovey, 28 Cal.3d at 24-25, 616
P.2d at 1313, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 140.
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Numerous studies now suggest a correlation between juror atti-
tudes and such variables as occupation, 23 6 sex, 2 3 7 race,238 and socio-
economic status.239 In addition, a juror's family, social, political,
and personal associations may all affect the juror's decision making.
Unfortunately, jurors are often unaware of these factors or the de-
gree to which they are affected by them.
The juror's mood at the time of trial may also be relevant. For
instance, a juror who has recently received a parking ticket which
was thought to be undeserved may be less sympathetic to the state's
case than a juror who has recently received an unexpected tax re-
fund. These observations about opinion formation and personality
dynamics may be neither original nor profound, but their relevance
to the concept of the impartial juror is rarely articulated or seem-
ingly fully appreciated. The psychological baggage that human be-
ings bring to the jury room renders illusory any talk of a truly
impartial juror.
In their writings, trial attorneys have been more willing to con-
cede the myth of the impartial juror than have judges in their opin-
ions. Trial manuals have long stressed the importance of jury
selection,240 on the premise that the same case, consisting of the
same evidence, conducted pursuant to the same trial strategy but
tried before different juries can result in different verdicts. 241 It may
be going too far to say, as some have, that jury selection is the
trial,242 but it is certainly one of its most critical phases. A lawyer
who can pack the jury with persons whose life experiences, values,
236 See, e.g., Broeder, Occupational Expertise and Bias as Affecting juror Behavior: A Prelimi-
nary Look, 40 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1079 (1965); Hermann, Occupations ofJurors as an Influence on
Their Verdict, 5 FORUM 150 (1970).
237 See, e.g., Snyder, Sex Role Differential and juror Decisions, 55 Soc. & SOCIAL RES. 442
(1971); Stephan, Sex Preudice injury Simulation, 88J. PSYCHOLOGY 305 (1974); Strodtbeck,
James & Hawkins, Social Status in jury Deliberations, 22 AM. Soc. REV. 713 (1957);
Strodtbeck & Mann, Sex Role Differentiations injury Deliberations, 19 SOCIOMETRY 3 (1956).
238 See, e.g., R. SIMON, THE JURY AND THE DEFENSE OF INSANITY 111 (1956); Broeder,
The Negro in Court, 1965 DUKE L.J. 19 (1965). The race of the juror, the defendant, and
the victim may all be relevant.
239 See, e.g., R. SIMON, supra note 238, at ch. 6; Adler, Socioeconomic Factors Influencing
Jury Verdicts, 3 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 1 (1973); Rose & Prell, Does the Punishment
Fit the Crime? A Study in Social Valuation, 61 AM.J. Soc. 247 (1955); Strodtbeck, James &
Hawkins, supra note 237. See generally Fried, Kaplan & Klein, supra note 206; Stephan,
Selective Characteristics of jurors and Litigants: Their Influence on juries' Verdicts in THE JURY
SYSTEM IN AMERICA: A CRITICAL OVERVIEW (R. Simon ed. 1975).
240 See H. BODIN, SELECTING A JURY (Trial Practice Series 1946); A. GINGER, JURY SE-
LECTION IN CIVIL AND CRIMINAL CASES (1985); NATIONAL JURY PROJECT, JURYWORK: SYS-
TEMATIC TECHNIQUES (2d ed. 1987); R. WENKE, THE ART OF SELECTING AJURY (1979);
Darrow, Attorney for the Defense, 8 ESQUIRE 35 (1936); Fahringer, supra note 7.
241 See e.g., Hermann, supra note 236, at 150.
242 See Fahringer, supra note 7, at 117 ("In most cases, the defendant's fate is fixed
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and personality incline them to his or her client's position has won a
significant battle in the overall war. Attorneys on each side thus vie
to choose jurors favorably disposed to their clients and/or wit-
nesses, their legal position, or the attorneys themselves. The key is
to identify subconscious partiality, because blatantly partial jurors
will be excused for cause by the opposition. The underlying prem-
ise, however, is that all jurors have had their personalities and opin-
ions shaped by their life experiences, and that there are no impartial
jurors.
V. CONCLUSION: TOWARDS A REALISTIC APPROACH
TO IMPARTIALITY
The attempt to give content to the concept of impartiality has
proven to be terribly frustrating. Supreme Court decisions which
purport to address various facets of impartiality are more concerned
with other values. The goals of the Court's equal protection and
cross-section representation decisions are primarily aimed at ensur-
ing that all competent persons have an equal opportunity to serve
on a jury and that no potential juror is discriminated against on the
basis of race, sex, religion, or other characteristic not related to
competency. 243 Ironic as it may seem, given that the sixth amend-
ment speaks of an impartial jury as a safeguard for the accused,
these decisions primarily benefit the state, its legal system, and the
jurors themselves. Cross-section representation on a nondiscrimi-
natory basis may result in either a partial or impartial jury. As the
theory underlying jury nullification indicates, however, impartiality
is not as important as the input of the full range of community val-
ues and, more cynically, the appearance of impartiality created
thereby. If asked to choose between a jury of blacks, women, and
Hispanics, for example, all of whom thought alike, and a jury of
white Anglo-Saxon Protestant males representative of a full range of
social and philosophical perspectives, the Supreme Court appar-
ently would prefer the former. It may be reasonable to accept some
loss of impartiality in favor of a gain in nondiscrimination, but this
sacrifice should be the product of a conscious and acknowledged
choice.
The Court may have focused on aspects of the jury other than
impartiality because of the elusiveness of the latter concept. In ad-
dition to the methodological problems in identifying impartial ju-
after jury selection."); Friloux, supra note 3, at 220-21; See also J. VAN DYKE, supra note
31, at 139.
243 See Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 175-77 (1986).
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rors, it is virtually impossible to define impartiality in any
meaningful, scientifically verifiable manner. This is in part because
the term refers to qualities jurors bring to their service that cannot
be measured by the results of their service, their verdicts. The diffi-
culty of giving content to a constitutional right is obviously no ex-
cuse for failing to attempt to do so. The point, however, may be
more basic: the impartial juror may not exist. All persons are influ-
enced by their upbringing, education, knowledge, including knowl-
edge about the case, and life experiences in ways that render
impartiality an illusion. While this insight may not have been fully
appreciated at the time of the coining of the term "impartial jury,"
social scientists are providing increasing empirical evidence of its
validity. 244
This is not to say that all juries decide cases on the basis of
prejudice rather than principle. In most instances they doubtless
attempt to follow judicial instructions and abide by the law. Often
the evidence will be so overwhelming as to allow but one verdict.
However, where there are complex facts, conflicting evidence, or
discrepancies in testimony, the leeway exists to resolve doubts by
yielding, albeit perhaps subconsciously, to personal sentiment. 245
Jurors most likely decide cases on an overall impressionistic basis
rather than by detailed examination of pieces of evidence, 246 which
should not be surprising in light of, for instance, the legal system's
reluctance to allow jurors to take notes247 or to provide them with a
transcript of the testimony.248 In reaching this impressionistic judg-
ment, it would be surprising if personal values and life experiences
did not play a role.
Even if a truly impartial jury is an illusion, the illusion may be
worth preserving. Public confidence in the legal system and the
244 Even if few attorneys to date have exploited the possible advantages to be gained
from jury selection techniques based on social science studies, and then only in major
cases, it can be expected that lawyers will increasingly attempt to capitalize on these
studies to impanel a jury predisposed to their side.
245 Kalven and Zeisel refer to this phenomenon as the liberation hypothesis. Factual
doubt liberates jurors to yield to sentiment. H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, supra note 18, at
164-67.
246 See W. CORNISH, supra note 3, at 164-66; Gross, Adversaries, Juries and Justice, 26 Loy.
L. REv. 525, 540 (1980). See alo Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 233 (1978)(jurors
must be able to remember important pieces of evidence or argument).
247 To permit jurors to take notes is within the discretion of the trialjudge. See United
States v. Palowichak, 783 F.2d 410, 413 (4th Cir. 1986); United States v. Maclean, 578
F.2d 64 (3d Cir. 1978). The discretion is often not exercised. See generally Petroff, The
Practice ofJuror Note-Taking-Misconduct, Right or Privilege, 18 OKLA. L. REV. 125 (1965).
248 See United States v. Rice, 550 F.2d 1364, 1374-75 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
954 (1977); United States v. Morrow, 537 F.2d 120, 148 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430
U.S. 956 (1977).
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willingness of parties, as well as the community, to accept a verdict
rest in part upon the perception that the case was decided by an
impartial jury. Commitment to the ideal of impartiality may also
promote fairer decision making by those chosen to serve as jurors.
Entrusting jurors with the decision in contests sufficiently significant
to get into court itself generates a sense of responsibility. The fur-
ther admonition that they be impartial challenges jurors to rise
above petty prejudices in an effort to be just.
Nor is there any reason to believe judges would be any better.
Like jurors, judges have biases resulting from their experiences, ed-
ucation, and values. 249 The jury at least has the redeeming feature
of representing collective community partialities, rather than the idi-
osyncratic partialities of one individual. Jurors can also challenge
each other during deliberation; there may be nobody to challenge
the judge's biases. Unlike judges, who quickly become habituated
to trials and for whom the deciding of cases may become routin-
ized, 250 jurors bring a freshness of purpose to those few cases they
hear.
Furthermore, even ifjury impartiality is a mirage, the search for
impartial jurors is worthwhile. Impartiality is not an absolute, but a
relative concept. To recognize that no person may be totally impar-
tial is not to deny that there are degrees of partiality. Impartiality is
an ideal to which the legal system should strive. It is an aspirational,
even if unattainable, goal.
Impartiality may be more a learned trait than an innate one.
Good intentions on the part ofjurors are a necessary but not a suffi-
cient condition to ensure impartiality. If the legal system wants to
maximize the percentage of citizens who participate in jury service,
and yet expects jurors to be impartial, it must be prepared to teach
them how to be impartial. Judicial admonitions and instructions are
249 W. CORNISH, supra note 3, at 175. See FRANK, supra note 7.
250 See W. CORNISH, supra note 3, at 14-77. Additionally, Forsyth observes that:
[A]lthough it may sound paradoxical, it is true that the habitual and constant exer-
cise of such an office tends to unfit a man for its due discharge. Everyone has a
mode of drawing inferences in some degree peculiar to himself. He has certain
theories with respect to the motives that influence conduct. Some are of a suspi-
cious nature, and prone to deduce unfavorable conclusions from slight circum-
stances. Others again err in the opposite extreme. But each is glad to resort to
some general rule which in cases of doubt and difficulty he may be guided. And this
is apt to tyrannize the mind when frequent opportunity is given for applying it. But
in the ever-varying transactions of human life, amidst the realities stranger than
fictions that occur where the springs of action are often so different from what they
seem, it is very unsafe to generalize, and assume that men will act according to a
theory of conduct which exists in the mind of the judge.
W. FORSYM, supra note 13, at 443-44.
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useful, but insufficient. "Impartiality training" may be required. 25'
Jury impartiality can, in the final analysis, best be understood by
recognition of both what an impartial jury is and what it is not. It is
not ajury composed of one's peers, one's friends, or one's equals in
society. It is not a jury of one's neighbors, or a jury representative
of the various ethnic, cultural, sexual, religious, or other identifiable
factions of one's community. It is not a jury chosen at random. 252
An impartial jury is not designed to function like a legal com-
puter, with its goal being the resolution of a dispute consonant with
general principles applicable to a class of like disputes. 25 3 Its focus
is on the parties and facts of the individual case before it, and
neither past nor future cases need influence its verdict, as they
might a judge's decision.
Impartiality involves more than not having a personal or finan-
cial interest in the outcome of a case. It involves more than not
knowing the parties, witnesses, participants, or anything about the
facts. It involves more than just the absence of partiality, although
that consideration should obviously not be ignored or minimized.
To be impartial is to assume a role which the legal system asks a
juror to play. It requires that the juror bring to bear a number of
distinct qualities. An impartial juror must respect the institutionally
created biases in favor of an accused, including the presumption of
innocence and the government's burden of proving guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt. Impartiality thus subsumes an acceptance of the
values inherent in the Anglo-American legal system. An impartial
juror must be willing and able to set aside pre-trial personal prefer-
ences and to suspend judgment until after hearing the evidence.
Impartiality thus subsumes neutrality and detachment. An impartial
juror must be equally open to persuasion by opposing counsel, as
well as by otherjurors. 254 Impartiality thus subsumes open-minded-
ness and evenhandedness. An impartial juror must understand and
251 See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
252 The expressed policy of the United States is for juries "selected at random from a
fair cross section of the community .... 28 U.S.C. § 1861 (1982)(emphasis added).
Random selection is desirable in order to avoid discrimination in juror selection. The
implicit caveat, however, is that random selection is only a starting point. A randomly
selected jury may be impartial but it may not be. Further screening is necessary to en-
sure impartiality.
253 The Supreme Court's acknowledgement in Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145,
156 (1968), of thejury's role in guarding against corrupt or overzealous prosecutors and
compliant, biased, or eccentric judges arguably constitutes a recognition that juries have
duties beyond mechanistic application of legal principles to factual disputes. See supra
notes 50-51 and accompanying text.
254 Ideally, all jurors should also contribute to the problem solving goal of the delib-
.erations. Such contribution, however, is not necessary to impartiality.
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resolve to follow judicial instructions. Impartiality thus subsumes
comprehension and commitment. An impartial juror must base his
or her vote on the evidence, objectively perceived, and the logical
inferences to be drawn therefrom. Impartiality thus subsumes ob-
jectivity and rationality. Finally, an impartial juror must be pre-
pared to temper, if appropriate, technical legal rules with more
universally recognized principles of justice.2 55 Impartiality thus
subsumes independence,2 56 a lack of rigidity, and a commitment to
fairness. The right to an impartial jury is the right to be tried before
a group ofjurors who approximate this ideal to a reasonably accept-
able, even if unquantifiable, degree. 257
255 In order for nullification to occur, the legal system must be constructed in a way
that will safeguard the jury's independence. While the power to nullify may or may not
be exercised in a given case, it is probably not analytically useful to describe a jury that
engages in nullification in terms of impartiality. It is incorrect to classify a jury that
convicts a defendant of a violation of an unjust law as not impartial, for the jury is not
responsible for the law's passage and has no obligation to acquit. On the other hand, it
is incorrect to label a jury that decided out of a sense of principle to acquit a defendant
charged with a violation of an unjust law as not having acted in an impartial manner. See
Montefiore, Kolakowski in NEUTRALITY AND IMPARTIALITY 204-07 (A. Montefiore ed.
1975).
256 The framework wherein a jury can act independently is supplied by the legal sys-
tem itself. By not asking jurors to supply reasons for their verdict, by not inquiring into
the process by which they reach their verdicts, and by not holding them legally accounta-
ble for their verdicts, the legal system provides an institutional framework for jurors to
be independent. Those very qualities which impede discovery of whether the jury acted
rationally or impartially also preserve the jury's ability to maintain its independence.
257 As indicated in the introduction, identifying the qualities that make for an impar-
tial juror, as this Article attempts to do, is only the first step in the process. Identifying
such jurors in practice is necessary if the legal system is to achieve its objective of im-
panelling an impartial jury.
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